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Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The country study on Denmark focuses on a few key
issues which are assessed in depth. Moreover, the ana-
lysis is conducted in a broader European framework
making comparisons and parallels with other member
countries and highlighting developments particularly
relevant in the context of progress towards EMU. The
studn therefore, &aws a number of conclusions relevant
for the conduct of policies in a wider group of countries
and not just Denmark.
The most important elements of the study may be sum-
marized as follows:
Firstly, the study explores the principal factors behind
Denmark's divergent growth performance during the
1980s. A strong acceleration in growth in the period
1983-86 occurred long before the European upswing had
gathered momentum. Thereafter, growth stagnated
while the European economy boomed.
This development is seen to reflect a strong exPecta-
tional response to a set of policies implemented by a new
government in 1982: fiscal policy was significantly
tightened while the use of the exchange rate as a policy
instrument was abandoned. Moreover, structural
policies involving deregulation, privatization and lib-
eralization were embarked upon.
The high credibility of the new hard currency regime was
evident in sharply falling interest rate differentials vis-
I-vis the DM. Lower nominal interest rates reinforced
optimistic expectations on the part of investors and con-
sumers, leading to an upward adjustment of the desired
stock of capital and consumer durables. This adjustment
in turn implied very high economic growth rates in
1983-86. The highly efficient and unrestricted Danish
capital market played a vital role in this result, which
may constitute an important lesson for the future: perfect
capital markets may render the business cycle highly
dependent on consumer expectations as the present dis-
counted value of higher expected future incomes will
influence consumer behaviour today.
Optimism in the economy collapsed suddenly in 1986:
interest rate differentials vis-I-vis the DM rose again
while economic growth despite very buoyant world trade
virtually stagnated. The performance of the Danish
economy since 1986 - low growth, rising unemployment,
stagnant real wages and low ex-post return on the invest-
ment projects of the 1983-86 period - suggests that the
optimism of that latter period to some extent was un-
founded. The study concludes that despite the change in
policy regime in 1982 and other structural policies em-
barked upon since then, there was actually little im-
provement in the capacity of the economy to
simultaneously reduce the major economic imbalances
in the period 1982-86. This may have been an important
factor behind the breakdown of expectations experi-
enced in 1986. Developments since 1986, however,
point to some improvement in supply conditions - even
beyond those recorded for most other high-income mem-
ber countries. The apparent change of behaviour of
agents may be ascribed to the hard crurency stance, the
tight fiscal policy (both reducing inflationary exPecta-
tions) and the tax reform of 1987, which facilitated more
efficient allocation of resources.
Secondly, the study discusses the question as to whether
a different macroeconomic poliry setting would have
produced a better ex-post set of results i.e. would have
avoided the overheating of 1985-86 and the subsequent
stagnation and rising unemployment. It is concluded
that littte could have been done given the overall policy
setting. This conclusion may be given a more general
dimension indicating that economic upswings fuelled by
expected structural improvernene may inevitably lead to
overheating, given constraints and the limited effective-
ness of economic policies. InDenmark, monetary policy
was signfficantly constrained by the ERM commitments.
The high credibility of the hard currency stance com-
bined with the high mobility of capital narrowed the
scope for independent monetary policy action. Fiscal
policy is shown by the Danish experience to have severe
limitations - even the sign of its policy impact may at
tirhes be difficult to predict. Finally, incomes policies
often work pro-cyclically by maintaining a level of com-
petitiveness that initially contributes to overheating and
widening profit margins, but subsequently leads to tight
labour market conditions and a "catch-up" in wages as
was, once again, the case in Denmark.
Thirdln the study examines the principal factors behind
the huge external debt accumulated notably during the
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. A very important
factor appears to be excessive housing invcstmcnt in-
duced by the unlimited tax deductability for interest
expenditures. The linkage between inllation and nomi-
nal interest rates combined with the tax deductability for
nominal interest expenditures led to significant distor-
tions of investment and saving decisions in the high
inflation years of the 1970s and the first half of the
1980s. The study also suggests that the extension of the
welfare state, notably during the 1960s and 1970s, may
have led to a lower desired levcl ofprivate savings' To
achieve this, the private saving rate has been temporarily
reduced. In the long term, however, welfare provisions
may not significantly affect the Private saving rate. For
this reason and given a continued tiSht fiscal policy and
low inflation (holding down i.a. the indirect subsidiza-
tion of housing), this part of the study concludes that the
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curTent account balance in the short to medium tenn may
continue on an improving trend - attaining a significant
surplus and thereby generating an important reduction of
the external debt burden.
Finally, the study discusses the implications for Den-
mark of fiscal approximation within the Community.
Due to Denmark's divergent tax structure with indirect
taxes being much higher than elsewhere - most import-
antly higher than in Germany - some harmonization is
needed before border controls are finally abolished, if
excessive cross-border shopping is to be avoided. The
study shows that the necessary indirect tax reductions
will have significant macro€conomic effects, which can-
not easily be neutralized by other economic policies. A
whole range of fiscal initiatives may be called for if the
important improvements in the external imbalances are
not to be reversed.
Nevertheless, the Danish economy has shown a signifi-
cant capacity to adjust to the best European standards
e.g. with respect to inflation and public sector finances.
These achievements will ultimately assist Denmark in
taking the next important steps forward in the process of
European integration and in reaping the full benefits of
the Internal Market.
Danish economic performance during the l9E0s
CHAPTER 1
IIANISH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING THE 1980s:
LESSONS FOR EUROPE
l.l.Introduction
This chapter focuses on a number of key, interlinked
issues exploring Denmark's divergent growth perfor-
mance relative to thc Community average in the 1980s:
an examination of the factors behind the strong econ-
omic upswing in 1983-86; an assessment of the signi-
ficance of the increased current account deficit in
1983-86 and of structural factors holding back the econ-
omy; and an interpretation of the macroeconomic policy
response to the current account. The analysis leads to a
series of conclusions on the Danish economic experience
and also to a set of reflections on the lessons for other
Community countries, particularly in the context of pro-
gress towards EMU.
1..2 Understanding the growth cycle of the1980s
1.2.1 The strong upswing: 1983.19E6
During the period I 983 to 1986, the growrh record of the
Danish economy was one of the best in the Community.
GDP grew at 4?o on average, while the unemployment
rate declined from lOTo to 87o and inllarion dropped to
3Vo. To understand this very favourable development, it
is not sufficient to consider only standard economic
transmission mechanisms; it seems that expectations
also played a major role.
The recovery started from a very low level. The reces-
sion of 1980 
- 
8l (related to the second oil price shock)
was deeper in Denmark than in all other Community
countries except for the UK. Although a series of de-
valuations within the EMS were carried out between
L9'79 and 1982 and fiscal policy was gradually relaxed,
demand fell and investment virtually collapsed in both
198 I and 1982. The combination of expansionary fiscal
policy and low economic activity led to a sharp rise in
the public sector deficit to a record level of some 97o of
GDP in 1982. On the capital market, interest rates shot
upwards, responding to the gloomy srate of the public
finances, high inllation and expectations of further de-
Valuations.
In the autumn of 1982, a new govemment substantially
altered economic policies. Fiscal policy was tightened
and the exchange rate was abandoned as a policy instnr-
ment. In addition, supply-side policies were introduced
aiming at greater flexibility in the labour market; notably
the wage indexation scheme was abolished.
For various reasons, financial markets quickly attached
a high degree of credibility to the hard currency stance.
Firstly, the new government had not been responsible
for previous devaluations. Secondln the tighter fiscal
policy, together with a fairly healthy level of competi-
tiveness, reduced the external constraint while the im-
plementation of incomes policy measures further
reduced medium and long-term expectations of DKR
devaluationsl. Finally, confidence was further srreng-
thened by liberalization of capital movements which
added an international dimension to the new policy dis-
cipline.
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1 ) The government declared a freeze on wages and profits from October 1982 to February 1983, and the pice indexuion of
wages was suspended mtil 1986 and abolished thereafter. hrblic seclor pay rises were set at a rather low level of 4 ?o for he
period 1983-85 and the private sector was urged to follow the norm. All in all the govemment took an active role in wage
(and price) determination
(2)
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The reduction in the high risk premium as a result of the
change in the economic policy regime in Denmark was
reflected in a fall of morc than 600 basis points in interest
rates between early 1983 and early 1984. Capital inflows
were substantial, producing a peak rate of increase in M2
of more thrt 25% in 1983. Interest rates fell ahead of
inflation and measured real interest rates decreased, as
inllation expectations and DKR devaluation exPecta-
tions faded.
Household confidence increased considerably. Private
consumer demand responded promptly and led to a sub-
stantial fall in the saving rate. Large positive wealth
effects because of falling interest rates reinforced the
decline in the private sectoJ saving rate to L6% n 1986
compared to?A% in 1982^.
The strong respoose of actual consumption to the change
in consumer sentiments was facilitated by an efficient
and unrestricted capital market. It may be an important
lesson for the future that more perfect capital markets
may render the business cycle highly dependent on con-
sumer expectations as consumption will be less sensitive
to changes in actual disposahle income and more sensi-
tive to changes in the present discounted value of the
expected future income stream (stemming from human
capital as well as from tangible assets such as houses).
The boom in output (16% rise over the four years to
1986) was driven entirely by domestic demand (growth
of 19% over four years) with the external sector actually
contributing negatively to growth. Investment in plant
and machinery rose by a spectacular 63% ovet the same
period. The iacrease in the current account deficit was
the counterpart exclusively of higher investment; na-
tional saving was steadily imFroving. Optimism was
reflected in the strength of capital inflows and a rise in
foreign exchange reserves.
1.2.2 The breakdown ln expectatlons and
performance: 19t6
The year 1986 marked a nrrning-point in Denmark's
economic development in the 1980s. The 1983-86 peri-
od had largely represented an adjustment to a more
optimistic set of expectations: a higher expected rate of
return increased the desired capital stock, while im-
proved household confidence and reduced interest rates
had similarly increased the desired stock of coiltumer
durables, including houses. This stock adjustment im-
plied very fast rates of growth over a certain period.
However, by 1986 the adjustment may have been largely
completed, leading to downward pressure on investment
in both producer and consumer durables.
Over the same period, the current account deficit had
increased to 5b% of GDP. Although this increase may
have been justified temporarily as it filled the gap be-
tween overall demand and production, the level of the
deficit was clearly unsustainable.
The nahrral downward pressure on domestic demand
growth as stock-adjustment was completed would in
itself have begun to produce a decline in the deficit, but
with negative repercussions on activity in the absence of
an improvement in competitiveness. However, the very
strong economic growth in the previous three years had
led to severe labour market tightness. Despite falling oil
prices, high pay rises in the Spring 1987 negotiations
seemed to be in prospect; unit labour costs were already
rising somewhat faster than those of ERM partners and
competitiveness against a wider group of panners (based
on unit labour costs in manufacturing) had already wors-
ened by S%obetween 1983 and 1986.
In thesc circumstances, the credibility of the exchange
rate was eroded. Private capital flows into Denmark
dried up, the foreign exchange reserves fell significantln
M2 decelerated sharply and inflation-adjusted interest
rates rose,
At the same time, the authorities were becoming increas-
ingly concerned about the current account position and
measures were implemented to contain private consump-
tion: in Spring 1986, excise duties on energy products
were increased substantially, and in the autumn of 1986
a surcharge on interest payments on consumer credit was
implemented ". The stage was thus set for a cyclical
downturn. The situation was worsened by high wage
settlements in the 1987 two-year wage round, reflecting
the persistently tight labour market conditions. Unit
labour costs soared by more than 8% in 1987, further
eroding competitiveness.
Against this background, measures to improve competi-
tiveness were implemented in late 1987. Social security
1)
2)
Wealth effects have been shown to play a major role in the uansmission of monetary policy, see e.g. A.M. Christensen and D.
Knudsen 1989. An imporunt elernent of this channel of transmission is the large gross portfolio of fixed interest rue bonds
held by the private sector. Also the real market value of onrrer-occupied houses, forming a sigrificant part of private sector
wealth vries inversely with nominal interest rates.
This was prt of a wider austerity package - the so-called "potato diet" - which also ontained an amen&nent of the mortgage
payment scheme, implying higher instalments in the begimring of a loan. This had a negative impct on house prices, which
were already falling.
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contributions per employee were partly replaced by a tax
on the VAI base '. As exports are exempt from VAT, this
measure may^ be interpreted as having some aspects of a
devaluation ".
1.2.3 Stagnatlon and uncertaln prospects
While growth accelerated strongly in the rest of the
Community, the Danish economy stagnated. The gap
between the growth of domestic demand and world de-
mand led to a substantial narrowing of the current ac-
count deficit in these years despite some loss in market
share. However, due to the higher excise duties on
energy and accelerating wage costs, inflation rose to a
level somewhat above lhe Community average - and
significantly abovc the German level - in 1986-88. By
1989, the unemployment rate was back at 9 U27o, com-
pared with about l0% in 1982 and slightly below 87o in
1986, and pay rises had moderated substantially.
The weak recovery which seemed to be unfolding in
1989 and the beginning of 1990, was halted by a combi-
nation of weaker world trade and a strongly appreciating
currency (in the six months to April 1990 the effective
exchange rate appreciated by more than 77o). At present,
there seems limited prospect of an early and sustained
economic recovery. Fiscal policy is relatively tight,
construction activity is still slowing down, consumer
sentiment seems to have changed firmly in the direction
of increased savings and world trade is envisaged to
grow only moderately in the short term. However, the
recent two-year wage settlement implies an improve-
ment in competitiveness and therefore gains in market
shares. Therefore, economic growth could eventually
pick-up in 1992.
Thc current account balance will remain on an improving
trend towards a significant surplus. Already in 1990,
current payments balanced after 26 years of deficit. The
main factor behind this development is a rise in private
sector saving, partly due to a steady rise in the net of tax
real rate of interest combined with a downward revision
of household expectations. Residential investment has
been falling sharply in recent years, for similar reasons,
and prospects are for a further reduction in 1991. All in
all, private sector saving (net of residential investment)
will increase strongly and should be capable offinancing
some growth in business investment. As will be argued
in Chapter 2, this strong turn-round in the current ac-
' count balance owes much to reduced inllation and so is
largely attributable to the hard currency st"nce 3.
1)
2t
This tax has now been kought before the European Court of Justice as a breach of the sixth VAT directive.
The usual by-product of a devaluation - higher inflarion - was pevented as the new taxes raised a srnaller revenue than the
old; thus, the package also contained an element of e fscal policy. The effect on competitivemess of this measure
is not fully rcflected in the graph above, which relates to per capita compensation for the whole of the manufacturing industy
and not just exporting firms.
But also the tax-reform of 1987 played an importmt rolq the marginal incomes ta.L rate was r€ducdfrom73% o 68% and
for net capital incomes even further to some 50%.
3)
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Since 1989, the inflation rate has again been converging.
During the first half of 1990, the rate of inllation fell
particularly sharply, responding to nominal curency ap-
preciation, wage moderation and some reduction of in-
direct taxes. Inflation is now below the German level (for
the first time for several decades) and is likely to remain
so for some years. Although this is encouraging, there
are no grounds for complacency: combining an accept-
able current account position with a return to growth
strong enough to reduce unemployment will require an
improvement in competitiveness; given the ERM con-
straint, this can only be achieved by maintaining a lower
rate of domestic inflation than that of partner countries.
How painful this process will be in terms of unemploy-
ment would to some extent depend on the impact of
German unification, the implications of which are ex-
plored in Box 1.1 below.
1.3 Structural issues
One possible reason for the break-down in optimism in
1986 and the disappointing growth performance of the
Danish economy over the 1980s as a whole may be that
structural improvements of the Danish economy, [o some
extent, failed to expand the capacity of the economy to
simultaneously alleviate the major economic imbalan-
ces. This was i.a. manifested in a strongly deteriorating
trade balance as economic activity accelerated in the
period 1983-86. Moreover, the actual implementation of
structural measures may have failed to meet expecta-
tions.
1.3.1 The deflclt exploslon of 1983-86: Justlfled
ex-ante, but a mlstake ex.post?
During the 1970s and 1980s, Denmark experienced a
persistent current account deficit leading to excessive
external debt and tight constraints on economic policy I.
The dramatic widening of the Danish current account
deficit during the 1983-86 boom was accounted for, on
an arithmetic basis, exclusively by an increase in invest-
ment; this, however, may have been interpreted (wrong-
ly) as a deterioration in the underlying current account
deficit. The widening appears to have represented the
private sector's reaction to a set of policies which were
perceived as improving Denmark's medium-term econ-
omic prospects. To that extent, the widening of the
deficit, i.e. the aggregate borrowing of individual firms
and households to finance their investment projects in
producer and consumer durables, could be seen ex-ante
as rational andjustifiable. Ex-post, however, the perfor-
mance of the Danish economy since 1986 - a period of
low growth, rising unemployment, stagnant real wages
and low ex-post returns on the investment projects of the
1983-86 period - suggests that the optimism of that
earlier period was unfounded.
Graph 5: Current rccount brlance.nd externrl debt
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1 ) The reasons for the persistence of the curent accormt deficit during the last decades are explored in Chapter 2.
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1.3.2 The burden of taxatlon and the slze of the
' publlc sector
At the beginning of the 1980s the burden of taxation in
Denmark was already high in relation to that in other EC
countries. By 1987, the tax burden in Denmark had
increased even further, and the comparison with the rest
of the Community was even more unfavourable 1. This
development may have run counter to the expectations
of the early 1980s (implications of the divergent tax
structure for the process of European integration are
explored in Chapter 3).
The government which took office in 1982 had as a
primary policy objective to reduce the share of the public
sector in GDP, which may have stimulated expectations
of tax cuts. On comparing the public sector expenditure
figures in 1982 and 1989, however, it may be concluded
that this has been only partly achieved; toral currenr
expenditures as a percentage of GDP fell by a modest I
point between 1982 and 1989. Nevertheless, the disag-
gregated figures reveal some success as public consump-
tion was reduced by some 3?o 9of GDP. However, this
reduction was partially offset by higher interest pay-
ments on the public debt. Transfer payments were un-
changed.
The fact that the share of the public sector in GDP has
not b€en strongly reduced can mainly be ascribed to
genuine resistance among the electorate to any drastic
cuts. Although preferences have moved somewhat in the
direction of a reduced public sector, all the basic ele-
ments of the welfare state remain unquestioned.
1.3.3 Labour market rlgidltles
Post-1982 govemments have taken a number of steps,
including the abolition of wage indexation, to improve
the flexibility of the Danish labour market. Neverthe-
less, important features of rigidity remain.
One indication of structural shortcomings is the uneven
distribution of unemployment. Thus, the 1.57o rise in the
unemployment rate between 1987 and 1989 (from7.97o
to 9.4?o) occurred without any increase in the share of
the labour force actually affected by unemployment.
Only the average length of unemployment spells in-
creased i.e. the long-term unemployed have born the
brunt of adjustment burdens. Moreover, unemployment
is also very unevenly distributed according to level of
skills and sex, with women and the unskilled being most
affected. This points to a serious insider-outsider prob-
lem. For the majority of the labour force, which is
largely unaffected by unemployment, there is little in-
centive to take into account the effecs of their wage
claims on the minority facing a higher unemployment
risk. This insider-outsider phenomenon is reinforced by
the fact that the marginal economic costs of unemploy-
ment are borne by the government and not by the labour
market partners.
The fact that the rate of long-tenn unemployment is high,
especially among women and the unskilled, may be
linked to the relatively high rate of minimum payment
(guaranteed wage) and a high replacement ratio for the
lower paid (90?o) ". Moreover, the unemployed continue
to be entitled to benefits for a very long period, Thus,
the incentives to prolong search periods are higher for
the lower paid than for the higher paid.
The current high rate of unemployment and the relatively
generous scheme of unemployment payments comprise
a significant share of public expenditure. Although
spending on labour market programmes, such as train-
ing, represents only slightly above l?o of GDP (approxi-
mately the same as spent in Germany, Netherlands,
Belgium and France), total expenditure on unemploy-
ment amounted to 5 V2?o of GDP in 1988, by far the
highest level in the Community.
Graph 6: Tax structure Denmark . EC-12
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It should be underlined that this tax increase was an important factor behind the fiscal consolidation, which conributed
importantly to stabilizing the extemal debt.
Compared with other EC-countries, ttre Danish system combines tl rr highest rr:r: '. ^ 'r ::ent ratio for the lower paid with ttre
lowest for the highest paid.
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1.3.4 Inflation, unemployment and the current
account balance:evldence of changes ln
supply condltlons
The significance of structural changes is to improve the
capacity of the economy to reduce imbalances, chiefly
by altering the behaviour of agents. This may be
achieved directly by changing the institutional frame-
work of the economy or indirectly by changing the mac-
roeconomic policy regime. Of all the Danish policy
initiatives taken during the 1980s, the tax reform of
1987, involving a reduction in the highest marginal in-
come tax rates and a simultaneous broadening of the tax
base, should be mentioned as an important institutional
adjustment to directly influence economic behaviour l.
However, changes in policy regime undertaken at the
beginning of the 1980s, implying a hard currency stance
and fiscal tightening may have been even more import-
ant.
While a formal test of structural improvements presents
many difficulties, some indications of aggregate effects
are provided by the simultaneous evolution of inJlation,
unemployment and the current account balance. Hence,
in this context a structural improvement is defined as an
increase in the capacity of an economy to simultaneously
reduce major economic imbalances. Thus, by expanding
the production potential of an economy through structu-
ral reforms, unemployment may be reduced at an un-
changed current account balance and non-accelerating
inflation. However, changes in the international envi-
ronment may also improve the conditions for simulta-
neously reducing major economic imbalances at low
rates of inflation. Such changes undoubtedly occurred
in the course of the 1980s with falling prices of raw
materials (notably oil) improving the terms of trade and
accelerated world trade. The latter tended to reduce the
costs in terms of unemployment of correcting a deficit
in the current account balance. However, improvements
of the latter type may be considered less genuine as they
may not facilitate a durable rise in the productive capac-
ity. In the following, we first inspect the simultaneous
developments in unemployment and inflation and then
in unemployment and the current account balance.
Inflation and unemployment
In an inflationr/unemployment diagram one would expect
short term demand induced movements to occur along
negatively sloped lines (the short term Phillips curve
trade-off). However, in the longer term, as behaviour of
agents changes, the short term trade-off is likely to shift.
Thus, an anti-inflationary strategy may initially lead to
higher unemployment, but could subsequently moderate
wage behaviour thereby causing a shift closer to the
origin. Such a jump may be said to represent a policy-
induced structural improvement as it simultaneously re-
duces major macroeconomic imbalances. The more
flexible the economy the faster this process will be.
Supply-side improvements in general are expected to
show up as movements towards the origin i.e. the same
level of unemployment (inflation) may be achieved at a
lower level of inllation (unemployment). Therefore, if
genuine structural improvements had significant effects
during the 1980s we should see decisive movements
towards the origin (reinforcing the effects from the more
favourable international environment).
On calculating the average value of inflation and unem-
ployment in 1981-82 - years with high oil prices and low
world trade - as well as in 1988-89 - years characterized
by the opposite situation - one sees a clear move towards
the origin for Denmark, Benelux and the UK. Germany,
France and ltaly, however, are unlikely to have achieved
decisive improvements beyond those given by the more
favourable international environment.
Unemployment and the current account
balance
In a current account/unemployment diagram, one would
expect short term changes in demand to be reflected in
movements along a positively sloped or vertical line. A
drop in the saving propensity would reduce the current
account balance (saving-investment gap) and at the same
time tend to reduce unemployment. If unemployment
does not fall, it could indicate that the economy operates
close to its capacity limit. In this case, the economy
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would move along a vertical line as higher wage-inlla-
tion would prevent domestic production from rising.
Supply side improvements, on the other hand, will shift
the "demand trade-off line" horizontally, i.e. lower un-
employment could be achieved at a given culrent ac-
count balance.
From this analysis, rlso, it may be concluded that Den-
mark, the Netherlands and Belgium have gained relative
to other high income Community countries during the
1980s - they have all moved towards the morefavourable
position of Germany (on the basis of the macroeconomic
variables observed). It would be tempting to conclude
that these structural improvements are largely the result
of the hard currency strategies lately embarked upon by
these countries i.e. the linkage to the D-Mark, and more
importantly that the consequences of this strategy have
been recognizedby economic agents. In this respect, it
is notable that information on pay rises in Germany has
become an increasingly important input for wage neSo-
tiations in the Benelux countries and Denmark.
A more detailed inspection of the current account/unem-
ployment development through the 1980s in Denmark
(see graph below), reveals that major structural achieve-
ments took place in the years 1986-87, presumably fa-
cilitated much by lower oil prices. Moreover, the graph
shows that the short-term trade-off observed during the
first half of the 1980s was not different from the one
observed during the late 1970s, suggesting that no im-
portant structural improvements materialized before ex-
pectations broke down in 1986. In the late 1980s, how-
ever, the trade-off may have become slightly steePer,
indicating a lower cost in tcrms of unemploy-ment of an
improvement in the current account balance r.
In total, there seems to be evidence for some improve-
ment in the underlying structure of the Danish economy
in the second half of the 1980s, which could be ascribed
to the important change in policy regime in the begin-
ning of the 1980s, implying a hard curency stance and
tight fiscal policy (imposing disciplined behaviour and
reducing inllationary expectations). But also the tax
reform of 1987 played a role as it facilitate a more
efficient allocation of resources.
1.4 Macroeconomic responses to the current
account
While the widening of the current account in the mid-
1980s may have partly reflected initial over-optimism
about supply prospects, the question of whether a differ-
ent macroeconomic policy setting would have produced
a better ex-post set of results cannot be avoided. From
the point of view of policy to maintain internal balance,
it makes little differeuce whether a current account dis-
turbance and subsequent adjustment to it are intertempo-
rally optimal or not; this is a question for fiscal and
structural policies. What is important for stability-
oriented policy is the extent to which the factors creating
1 ) For a debtor cormry like Denmark, a rise in international interest rates rcnd !o push the short-term rade-offschedule
rightwards. Thus, the interest rate hikes of the late seventies and the beginning of the 198(h, served to reinforce the effecs of
the higher oil prices in 1981-82.
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such disturbances also produce successive periods of
overheating and recession.
Unfortunately, Denmark suffered overheating in the
deficit-widening phase (with very tight labour market
conditions that inevitably, albeit with the usual lag, pro-
duced very high wage settlements in 1987), followed by
a long stagnation and sharply-rising unemployment. A
policy ofhigher interest rates during the 1983-86 period,
followed by a relaxation of monetary policy thereafter
might have produced an initially less dramatic but more
durable economic upswing, greater selectivity in the
timing of investment projects both by firms and by
households and higher ex-post returns on those projects.
However, in order to obtain greater disin-flationary credi-
bilitn the Danish authorities had after 1982, through
abandoning the exchange rate as an instrument, ruled out
the possibility of significantly greater monetary pollcy
flexibility.
Fiscal pollcy is clearly shown by the Danish experience
to have severe limitations. Even the sign of the impact
offiscal policy appeared to change during the course of
the 1980s (see Box I .3 on fiscal policy). Moreover, even
when it did appear to have the conventionally-expected
impact (damping activity in 1986-1987) its exercise as
an instrument of stabilization was inevitably constrained
by the intertemporal allocation and supply-side con-
siderations proper to the conduct of fiscal policy.
As for lncome pollcles, experience in a large number of
countries most recently Portugal - tends to show that
they can be self-defeating in an upswing (to the extent
that they initially succeed in restraining wage increases,
they improve or maintain competitiveness at a level that
contributes to overheating, a widening of profit margins,
a tightening of the labour market and ultimately a "catch-
up" in wages). In the downswing, evidence on the ability
of incomes policies to have an effect independent of
those of other macro-economic policies, including ex-
change-rate policy, is mixed.
In sum, given the constraints on a limited effectiveness
of macro-economic policies, the pronounced and in
many ways unfortunate cyclical experience of Denmark
during the 1980s may have been inevitable; in the face
of an intially favourable shock to private sector expec-
tations, the cyclical swings in performance could only
have been avoided by substantial structural reforms
(early implemented), e.g. aimed at greater labour market
flexibility.
1.5 Conclusions and implications
Denmark's current account is at last back in surplus after
26 consecutive years in deficit; the budget, although no
longer in surplus, shows a deficit below the average for
the Community or even for the original members of the
narrow band; and Danish inllation is, and seems likely
to remain, among the lowest or even the lowest in the
Community. These are indeed very important achieve-
ments. However, growth and employment performance
especially during the second half of the 1980s has been
somewhat les positive, This salient feature of recent
experience indictes a risk in relation to the country's
recent progress in convergence.
The inflation indicator, in particular, may prove to be
somewhat misleading. If growth is to be restored and
unemployment reduced while domestic demand remains
weak relative to trend output (so as to create the current
account surplus required to reduce excessive external
debt) the trend in Danish costs and prices must remain
below those in partner countries given the exchange-rate
constraint.
All in all, the important achievements on inflation and
the current account balance are to some extent results of
low growth and high unemployment. Nevertheless, some
structural improvement appears to have occurred in the
late 1980s, illustrated by a relatively more favourable
trade-off between inllation and the current account bal-
ance on the one hand and unemployment on the other. It
is suggested that the change in the policy regime in the
early 1980s, implying a hard currency stance and tighter
fiscal policy as well as the 1987 tax reform played a
major role in this relatively favourable development.
For other Community countries, perhaps the main les-
sons of the Danish experience of the 1980s - mirrored,
in some respects by UK experience - concern the re-
sponse of macro-economic policy management to the
current account and inllation implications of initially
favourable shifts in private sector confidence. The ex-
tent of the increase in domestic demand resulting from
those shifts may or may not be justified. However, the
primary concern of governments should not be with the
current account consequences of improved private sector
confidence. The first concern should be to ensure that
future supply rises sufficiently to service the external
debt (or reduction in external assets) and thus validate
the initial increase in demand. Good supply-side
policies are an essential element in responding to the
€mergence of, or widening in, a current account deficit.
Nevertheless, stability-oriented macroeconomic
policies also have a role to play. However justified an
increase in private sector consumption and investment
demand may be ex ante, the initial impact is likely to put
additional pressure on available productive resources, as
additional demand precedes additional new capacity. If
policy is not sufficiently vigilant, additional pressure of
demand on resources may lead to accelerating inflation.
Accelerating inflation, if it is to be reversed or even
contained, brings recession in its train. In other words,
the phase of current-account deficit reduction will be
accompanied by an underutillzation both of labour re-
sources and of capital, including capital newly installed
as a result of the initial burst of oprimism. Inevitably,
aggregate real income and rate of return expectations
will fail to be realized. Households will find themselves
overstretched and firms will conclude that their invest-
ment resources have been wasted on unprofitable pro-jects. Financial constraints, loss of capacity and, if
hysterisis is present, permanent supply side losses may
result.
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Box 1.1: IMPACT OF GERMAN ANIFICATION ON
THE DANISII ECONOMY
For a number of reasow German unification is likcly to
have a greater impact on the Danish economy than on most
other EC ecotpmies:
*Denmark is the Community country geographically clo-
sest to the new liinder, even closer than somc of the West
German liinder. This may prove a vital competitiveness
factor, rctably for *ports with a high sertices content.
This may ako prove important for tourism.
*The industrial structure of Dentnark is in some rcspects
similar to that to which the ncw liinder may aspire; a
relatively large agricultural sector and associated indus-
tries to manufacture the agricultural products and equip-
ment for use in the sectot. During the phase of
reconstruction, Dentmark could be an importat supplier of
equipment and luow-how to these industries.
*Denmark holds a competitive advantage in a number of
products which are likzly to be in high demand in the new
liinder. These include:
-food products
-equipment for the agricultural sector
-residential and infrastructural construction
-equipment and know-how for pollution control.
*After years of low ecotpmic growth, Derunark has sub-
stantial excess capacity within a number of sectors and
industries e.g. the construction sector. Therefore, delivery
time may be shorter for Denmark than from competitors.
As the ncw liinder seem to be aiming for a swift reconstruc-
tion this could. prove an important advantage in competi-
tion,
*Major effects of unificationwill be directly and indirectly
transmitted through the former West Germany, which con-
stitutes the single most impoftant export market for Den-
mark, comprising about one fifth of all merchandise
exports.
*Onthefinancial side, the DKR is pegged closely to the DM
and capital markzts are highly integrated. The increase in
interest rates initiated by the unificationwill therefore have
some negative effects on economic activity and the current
account balance. The fact that Denmark has a large exter-
nal debt - a substantial part of which is denominated in DM
- makes this a rather important aspect of the unification
Process.
The hypothesis of stronger "unification effects" for Den-
mark than most other countries is to some extent confirmed
in the Burdesbank trade statistics up to December 1990.
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Whereas exports to Germany grew by some 10?o in nominal
terms from thefirst half of l9E9 to the same period of 1990,
the growth rate was some 27% in the six months to Decem-
ber 1990. Such an accelerationwould transhte into afull
year effect ontotal exports of more than37o, approximately
c6
0,5
(3)
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the sanc effect as calcuhtcd for tlu Netlerlands and
Belgium.
Dconomlc eJfects on Denmerk olGermtr unlllcrtlon
On the assumption that Dewnark will achieve at lcast the I
same markzt share in the nat ldnder as in the former West
Germany, g simulation has been runlto tr*" the prircipat;-;;;;:;;;;;;tr;;;;;;;i,, **olceinunrtr"oiion I '* .'e'=-te2 teeue2mgcroecoflomac cttccan uft uzuru * ut vcf .t f. -r..t.Ls..vt. 
fortheyearslgg0-lgg2. Thcassuacdprofileof theboost I Annual%change
to exports is consistent with the latest DGJI fotecast for I Exporb 1.0 LS 0.6 4.1Gerrnanyz. I ^^-I GDP
Regarding irrtcrcst rates, it is assumcd that long-term DM I ""' 
0'4 l'0 0'5 l'9
,oi", *" ,o* 2 percentage poitus higher duc to German I bn DKR
unification. ForatlottvrERMcurrcnciesinlerestratesare I Balanccoftradcin l.l 2.2 O.7 4.0
assumed il4 perccntage points higher, Fkatly non-ERM I eo"at and rcrviccs
interest rates are assumed unchanged. For thc avcroge I NetinterectPsyments l.l 1.3 4.1 2.3
rate on the Danish loreign debt, this would mean a 314'l I ^percentage poiru ircreasi assuning that the 
"urr"n"y-"o^- I lff""t 
account bal- 0.0 0.9 0.8 1.7
positionofthe external debt is unchanged'. I ,Om
The effects shown in the table above indicate that German I fmptoyrr*nt t ,t ,a ,
unificaion would not be *pected to lead to anl strcng I
improvencnt in the current accottnt balatue. Even though I
the balance of trade in goods atd services nuy imprwc by
some 4 bn DKR (05% of GDP) in the three years to 1992, Most importatly, the simulation indbates that unification
thecurrentaccountbahrcecouldinpracby lessthanhalf may lead to higher output and employment. Thus, output
of this amount, due to higher interest palrrunts on thc could bc some 2% higlvr in 1992 than witlput Gcrtman
external debt. unification while some 37000 additional jobs nay have
been created (1.3% of the labour force).
2l Due o wrificatio& the volurne of expors to Germany are assumed to inctease by 5?o n 1990, l29o n L99l ai 3% m lW).
3) Recent bdans.e of payments statistics show less acceleration in net interest paym€trB thm expected which could be due to
some portfolio reallocation.
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Box 1.2: MONETARY POLICY: STRATEGY,STANCE
AND PROSPECTS
Stratcgy
In 1982, the Danish authorities optedfor a hard currcnc!
stance as a central element of the new economic policy
regime. The primary aim of ,nonetar! policy - assuring
price stability - was thought to be best served by adopting
the strategy of "tying one's hands" and, to lower the ad-
justment costs in the process of disinflation, by borrowing
the Bundesbank credibility. From 1983 to the beginning of
1987, the DKR has bcpt an internediate position between
the ECU and the DM (it appreciated somewhat against the
ECU and depreciated somewhat against the DM); since
then the DKR has been effectively pegged to the DM and
fluctuations against the ECU have been accepted.
In an environnunt of highly liberal capital movements,
exchange-rate stability has to be guaranteed by the inter-
est-rate differential vis-ri-vis other ERM curuencies, with
the spread being afunction of credibility of the exchange-
rate cornmitment (leaving aside the short-term possibility
of changing the lQuidiry position). Improving crcdibility
has, therefore, become a prirury policy aim.
Over the 1986-90 pcriod as a whole, short and long-term
interest rate differentials against the DM more than halved,
indicating that markzts ircreasingly believe in Denmark's
exchange-rate commitment. The gain in confidence is also
reflected in a decrease in the volatiliry of shoil term interest
rates. This gain in credibility should be seen as the result
of Denmark's firm exchange rate policy, particularly on
occasions when markets feared that the hard currency
stance would possibly ttot be politically bearable. From
1985 to early 1988, uncertainty about political develop-
tnents appeu to have dominated market teelings. During
the low-credibility period, the interest-rate spread vis-d-vis
Germany remained at levels above 4 percentage points,
with a peak in early 1987 in the context ofthe last realign-
ncnt inthe EMS. After May l9SE,whenthe ruling govern-
ment was confirmed in power by a parliamentar) election,
the spread against German rates dropped sharply to below
2 perceuage points. It seems likcly that the short and
long-term differential will narrow further in the near fu-
ture: provided that the hard currency stance is continued,
Danish inflation will remain below that of Germany.
However, Denrmark's exchange rate credibility is far from
perfect as can be seen in times of tension within the ERM.
In such periods, the markets still look at the DKR as a
potential candidate for depreciation. This was obviously
the case early in 1989, when the Bundesbank favoured a
DM revaluation and the dffirential irrcreased again to
some4 percentage poirts with the DM by the end of the year
(some 2 percentage points with the ERM). The mistrust
may be explained by lingering memories of Denmark's
unfavourable inflation performance and external con-
straint.
Since the beginning of 1989, the spread has again narrowed
considerably with German rates (to some llhpercentage
points) and to virtually zero with the ERM. Inflationary
pressures in Germany and. uncertainty about the implica-
tion of German unification ma, partly explain this develop-
ment, but the main contributing factor is clearly the de-
celeration of unit labour costs in Denmark. This decelera-
lion is a already a great achievement; how*er, to convince
markts that thc dilfrculties of the past hove been petma-
nently overcomc, increases in wage costs and prices will
nced to remain below those in Germany fot sornc time.
Stancc
The Dawturks Nationalbank has only limited room for
independent monetary policy action, and policy moyes are
dominated by developments in tlrc ERM and to a certain
extent by the Bundesbank. However, morptary policy has
not always strictly followed the Burdesbank, rather the
Danish authorities have always tried to find the appropri-
ate ,nanctary policy response within the given consfiaints,
which have been tested from timc to time. The close link to
the DM has been a problem for Danish competitiveness at
times when the DM appreciated against Sterling and the
USD. The question has been raised whether the DKR-DM
is an optimal currency area. However, the problem has
been eased by the ircreasing integration of the Danish
economy into the Cotrununity marker, the entry of Sterling
into the EMS and the increased linbge of the other Scan-
dirwvian cunencies with the DM.
In Denmark, as in other small open ecotpmies, thc inter-
pretation of aggregates is not easy and ,r@netar! aggre-
gates may not necessarily be a good predictor of ecoromic
d*elopments.The analysis here is based onmarlcet indba-
tors: yield curve movements, interest-rate spreads and the
effective exchange rate. In addition, significant reserye
flows may serve as an indicator of whether Denmark is
approaching its limits of independent policy action.
.In 1985, the rormally sloped yield-curve moved down
quite remarlubly and at the same time flattened some-
what. The interest-rate differentials from the DM and the
ERM average are volatile during the first half of the year,
but the overall terdercy was rather flat, with spreads
between 4 
- 
5 percentage poirxs against the DM and
around 3 percentage poiats against thc ERM. Denmark
followed the international trend towards falling interest
rates. The effective DKR exchange rate appreciated sig-
nificantly. Within the ERM, the DKR was appreciated by
0.15 lo on 22 July and remained in the upper half of the
band over the year. With the benefit of hindsight it nay
be said that an overall tightening of economic policy
would have been appropriate in 1985: this would have cut
the cyclical peak and probably have helped to prevent
inflatiotury pressures in the following year. However,
there was ,rot much room for an independent monetar!
tightening, given that reserve flows were already strong
and positive.
. In 1986, the yield cume turned upwardswith interest rates
at the short end virtually unchanged. The significant
steepening of the yield curve irdicates that markets were
expecting a higher future inflation rate. While the inter-
est-rate spread with Germany remained at its high level
between 4-5 qer -e-tage points, the differential with the
ERM and the USA mcreased sharply from levels of arourd
1.5 percentage points to some 4-5 percentage points. The
nominal effectbe exchange rate appreciated significa*ly
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and within the ERM , the DKR appreciated by about 4!o in
two realigwaents. Given the strong re$erve outflows, in
particular at thc begiming of the year, afurther monetary
tightening would have been feasible. However, the econ-
omy was already slowing and, in the co$ext of unfavour-
able current account developments, a further
appreciation of the DKR might have been considered too
strong a burdenfor the exporting sector. Nevertheless, a
tighter starte could possibly have deepened the coming
recession but perhaps also speeded up the adjustment
Process.
. In 1987, short-term rates jumped at the beginning ofthe
year whea the Nationalbank raised rates in the moncy
rnarket in conjunctionwithforeign exchange unrest. Mar-
kets had expected a significant depreciation of the DKR,
which turned out to be only mitar at -0.45 7o in the last
realignmet in the EMS on 12 lanuary. Interest-rate dif-
ferentials to Germany and the ERM peaked at 7 and
5.5 percentage points respectively. During the year,
spreads came down again towards the levels of the pre-
vious years. The intertutional reaction to the October fall
in share prices also influenced Dennark's interest rates.
Massive reserve inflows gave the Nationalbank some de-
gree offreedom to induce monzy market rates to fall faster
than abroad. The gercral monetary loosening in the last
quarter of 19E7 was welcome at a time when the Danish
econom, was in recession.
. In 1988, Denmark's interest-rate pattern deviatedfromthe
international otu: short-term rates were rather stable
while long-term rates were falling in the second half of
the year, the yield curve moved d.ownwards and flattened.
The dffirential with Germany halved to a level of some
2.5 percentage points ard vanished with respect to the
ERM. These d*elopments were due to the continuing
stagnation of the Danish economy, while there u)as an
upswing abroad. Considerable net Krone bond sales (to
non-residents) supported the drop in interest rotes and the
country's external liquidity situation improved further.
The effective exchange rate continued to lall oyet the
year. Overall, morntary conditions were expansionary
and there may even hove been some room for further
easing. Given the weak economy the easing was welcome
and made possible by continuing wage moderation and a
tight ftscal policy.
. In 1989, a steep rise in short-term rates led to an inverted
yield curve for the first time in the 1980s. The general
international motutary policy tightening had only a very
weak impact on the Danish bond markct, confirming that
the markzt expected the inflationary trend to be only
temporary. The limits of independent monetary polic!
were tested twice in 1989. The DKR reached the lower
intervention point before Easter and on Ii October. In
both cases speculation against the DKR (initiated by ru-
mours about a realignment, in response to political press-
ures for a DM appreciation by the Bund.esbank and
significant reserve losses, in particular in October when
Detwnrk's tet internatiotul liquidity reached a bottom
level of 38.6 bn Kroner) forced the Nationalbank to
tighten even mote than in other counffies. The interest-
rate spreads widencd again, from some I 5 to near 4
percentage poius agaiwt the DM ardfromvirtual$ zero
to 1.5 percenrage points against the ERM.
After three years of prolonged stagnation in the economy
,there were srgns of a weak recovery. However, the stance
of monetary polrcy was probably too tight tiom the view-
point of national economic developme$ and the significau
appreciation of the effective DKR rate was detrirncntal to
the country's external perforrnance. Giventhe slow growth
of unit labour costs, which came down from 4th% in 1988
to 2 9o in 1989, inflationary pressures were already on a
declining trend.
Prospects
Dentturk may hove little cottrol over monetary aggre-
gates, but their movements may still be significant although
a simple direct causal link between growth in money supply
and inflation cannot be established. In the early 1980s,
various rounds of speculation took place against the DKR,
which was generally expected to be devalued, and there
were important capital flows out of the country, Instead
devaluing the currency, however, the governrnent adopted
a draconian program of fiscal retrenchment and non-ac-
commodating monetary policy, as described above. At the
same time, exchange controls were removed; restrictions
on capital inflows were abolished invaediately, and con-
trols on outflows were phased out over ty{o years, The
result of all this was a reversal of the expectations atd a
renewal of confidence, and hetrce, large capital inflows.
Consequently, the M2 ,norutar! aggrcgate grct! at a rapid
pace in the subsequent years, with a 25.4% increase in
1983 and a 17.81o increase in 1984. The speed of morcy
growth and, the extent ofthefall in interest rates undoubted-
ly cushioned the impact of fiscal contraction, but overall
the exchange rate cotnmitment in this period probably con-
tributed to easier monetary canditions than desirable. In
1986, the sign of the external constraint was reversed in the
sense that maintaining equilibrium ia the foreign exchange
market would have required a tighter monetary policy
stance than was desirable for domestic reason$. A similar
dileruaa rmay have occurred in 1991.
The increased credibility in the hard currenc, stance and
the possible move of the EMS towards irrevocably fixed
exchange rates, nuy diminish the role of expectations about
the risk of exchange-rate adjustments. In view of this fu-
ture, Denmark has committed itself to target domcstic
mone! creation. Targeting a monetary aggregate in a
small open economy withfree capital movements and inter-
nationally integrated markets is justified in the frattcwork
of a common European rr@nctary policy. The aggregates
monitored so far include DKR as well as foreign currenc!
deposits and are thus not appropriate. However, the Na-
tionalbank has recently compiled an appropriate aggregate
that could be targeted.
Although targeting the domestic counterparts of morcy
creation may become crucial in the cooperative setting
monetary policy in Stage I of EMU, such targeting will
have to be applied flexibly and does tut of course i
increase the limited scope for using monetary policy for
d,ome st ic st ab il izat ion p olic ie s.
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Box 1.i: FISCALPOLICY: MEASURES AND IMPACT
Fiscal policywas tightencd substaniallyfrom 1983 to l9E6
both by cutting expenditures and by increasing taxesr - The
share of expenditures in GDP fell by sottu 4r/z percentage
poirts, partly due to cyclical effects, bu also because pub-
lic consumption as a fraction of GDP was reduced. In
1984, public consunption even fell in real terms (for the
first time for decades) . In the same period government total
receipts rose by some 5?o of GDP as both direct taxes and
indirect taxes increased.
From 1983 to 1986, corpotate taxes rose more than three-
fold reflecting strong profits. For finarrcial institutions,
capital gains (or losses) on stocl$ are put up front immedi-
ately. Hence as long-term interest rates fell substantially
in the mid-1980s, important capital gains were recorded,
boosting profits.
Another important source ofincreasing revenuewas the tax
on real interest incomes introduced in 1984 2. Already in
1986, the "real interest-rate tax" raised a net revenue of
more than llo of GDP. This tax is very interesting for two
reasonr,. Firstly, it explains a significant part of the im-
provement ofthe publicftnances. Secondly, il is unlikcly to
have influenced private sector behaviour substantially.
The tax collection is administered by the pensionfunds and
banks and many pension savets are not even aware that they
pay the tax.
The revenue from indirect taxes rose somewhat in 1986.
Against the background of a strongly deteriorating current
account balance in the spring of 1986, it was decided to
counterbalance the boost to real disposable incomes ofthe
falling oil prices by increasing encrgy excise duties.
The experience with fiscal policy during the first half of the
1980s has been quite remarkable as the significant fiscal
tightening of 1983-1986 did not depress demand. Onthe
contrary, economic growth accelerated strongly from some
2Vz% in 1983 to more than 4% in 1985. The combination
of tigl* fiscal policy and strong economic growth led to an
exceptional turn around in the public sector balance from
a deficit of 7!o of GDP in 1983 to a surplus of 3rhlo of GDP
in 1986.
Fiscal policy was somewhat more lax in 1987-1989 than in
the previous three-year periodt. Th" looser fiscal policy
could primarily be ascribed to increased transfer payments
and compensation of employees (the wage accord of 19E7
gave public employees an extra payment due to ileJerreil
salary increases from lhe previous period). The combina-
tion of lower economic activity andftscal loosening caused
the public sectot balance to move back into deficit in 1989.
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The direct negative impact on GDP of fiscal policy may be assessed to have besr of the order of some 4.5 9o from 1983-1986,
Finansredegoerelsen I 990.
This tax allows pension savers to get a retum of 3.5 9c plus the annual rate of infleriar, with the government "creaming offl'
anything which is lefr
The cumulative impact on GDP may be estimated at some l7o, Finarsredegoerelsen, 1990.
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From the Danish experience with fiscal policy in the 1980s
it may be deduced - as is the case alsofor the UK - that one
cannot easily predict the overall effect offiscal policy on
economic activity. When fiscal policy was tightencd sub-
stantially in 1983-84, contrary to conventional wisdom,
GDP growth accelerated stongly to abwe 4%. However,
whenfiscal policy wasfurther tightened in 1986 the annual
growth of GDP decelerated and even showed a negative
figure in 19E7.
To urderstand this development orv has to look at changes
in motutary conditions which might have been induced by
fiscal policy. In 19E2, the goverwnent abandonzd the use
of the exchange tate as a policy instrument ard thereafter
embarkzd upon a policy of liberalizing capital movements.
This meant that any change in exchange rate expectations
would have stronget repercussions on capital rnaverncnts
and interest lates than before- In I98j -84, the interest rate
spread against the DM narrowed substantially indicating
higher exchange rate credibility. To the extent that this
change in expectations w(N triggered by the fiscal tighte-
ning, the overall effect on economic activity of the latter
was positive. By contrast in 1986-E7, the interest rate
spread against DM widened again sigrulling fading ex-
change rate credibility, reinforcing the conventional fiscal
policy effects. Therefore, even the sign of the fiscal policy
effects may at times be difficult to estimate.
By changing rules andlor the structure of tares, fiscal
policy may change irrcentives to savc and invest and thereby
affect economic activity. The exact effects moy be dfficult
to estimate in advance. The chief elemcnt of the tax reform
of 1987 was a lower tax rate on nct interest ittcomes; thc
marginal tax tate was reduced from about 70!o to about
50%. This reduction diminished the itrentives to purchase
conswrur durables on credit. Also il had a rcgative effect
on residential investment by reducing the efective subsidy
on housing. Tatation on nominal interest rates leads to an
ircreasing tax burden on real interest ittomes, at higher
rates of inflation. However, as inflation had been reduced
substauially from two digit figures in the begirning of the
1980s to some i-51o in the mid 1980s, real rates after tax
had already ittreased substantially before the tax reform
was implemened: in this respect the tax reform was of
secondary importance l. Nevertheless, the signal effect
was strong and may have persuaded households that the
rewards from saving had actually increased considerably.
This effect was reinforced by the 20% surcharge on interest
palments on consumer credit, introduced in the autunn of
I 9 E6, but abolished at the end of I 989. U ndoubtedly, these
are major conributing factors to the low growth rates of
the years 1987-89.
1 ) Apart from re&ring the tax burden on real interest rates, the tax reform also reduced the muginal tax rate on labour incomes
from73?o to 68%, while broadening the tax base. Therefore, the reform also had important effecs on the allocation of labour.
Current account performance and external debt t7
CHAPTER 2
CURRENT ACCOUNT PERFORMANCE
AND EXTERNAL DEBT
Introduction
The external deficit has been one of the most debated
issues in Danish economic policy for decades and exter-
nal targets have strongly influenced macroeconomic
policies. Nevertheless, a significant current account
deficit has persisted for a quarter of a century leading to
a mounting externrl debt, which, although the current
account balance has at last moved into surplus, will
continue to constrain economic policies in the medium
term.
The present chapter sets out to explore the persistence of
the current account deficit during the 1970s and 1980s
from various angles and is organised as follows. In the
first section, the development of the curent account
balance is assessed by exploring its main elements, not-
ably exports and imports. This conventional assessment
tends to set the policy focus chiefly on external compe-
titiveness which is defined broadly as comprising
relative factor costs as well as the composition of pro-
ducts and markets. In the second section the relevance
of monitoring the current account balance is discussed.
We conclude that special attention should be given to the
effects of the fiscal system on the investment and saving
decisions of the private sector. Thus, in the third section,
saving and investment behaviour is analysed at a secto-
rally disaggregated level. Finally, section four gives a
brief description of the current account balance and the
accumulation of external debt during the last two de-
cades. This section aims at assessing the requirements
for, and costs of, stabilizing and reducing the external
debt.
2.1 External performance: a conventional
assessment
2.1.1 Pattern of trade
After entering the Community in 1973, the direction of
Danish exports changed in favour of the EC countries.
Nevertheless, the share of non-Community trade in total
trade remains important. Whereas some 45Vo of exports
went to EC countries in 1973-74, the share was some
5O% in 1980 and was unchanged in 1989. Germany is
by far the most important single market for exports with
a share of about one fifth of total. Until the late 1970s,
the UK enjoyed this position.
While the Community increased in importa[ce as an
export market for Denmark, the other two Scandinavian
countries, Sweden and Norway, decreased in import-
ance. But, Scandinavia remains very importantfor Dan-
ish exports, with a share of slightly less than one fifth of
the total in 1989. [n thc Community context, Denmark
is unusual in having relatively large and increasing ex-
port shares in Japan (some 4% of total exPorts). In fact,
a bilateral trade surplus was recorded with Japan in 1988
and 1989.
Regarding product composition, Denmark stands out as
a very important food exporter. Agricultural exports
comprise one quarter ofall goods exported and manufac-
tured food products almost 3O% of all industrial exPorts'
This heavy specialization in food products is often con-
sidered to be disadvantageous as the growth of markets
for these products is relatively low and food production
does not involve high technology.
Other important export products are agricultural and
industrial machinery (137o), chemicals (10%) and wood
& furniture (7%).
Exports of services are also very significant in Denmark,
which has the second largest merchant fleet in the Com-
munity (after Greece). Although the revenue from ship-
ping has declined in importance, it still represented some
l$?o of total exports ofgoods and services in 1989.
2.1.2 Overall export performance
The 1970s saw substantial changes in the (weighted)
market shares t of Danish industry and agriculture'
While accession to the Community in 1973 led to a
strong rise in market share for agricultural exports, in-
dustry suffered market share losses of some l0% during
the decade. Declining competitiveness was a direct con-
tributory factor, while an expansionary fiscal policy re-
duced the economy's export capacity.
1 ) i.e. market shares in volume terns given oonstant weighs of exports as regads ountriee and pro&tcts. In contrast,
unweighted market shares denote the acnral share of exports in world impor$ both in current priccs. The ternr "weighted
mrket shaes" is importmt becsuse even though all Danish exporters had performed well in their particular mukets, overall
Denmark oould still lose mrket shues if tlre particular markets of Danish exporters were grcwing slower thsr other mrkets.
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In 1979-1982, competitiveness improved substantially
due to a series of devaluations within the EMS (see graph
2). The expansionary fiscal policy which was pursued
simultaneously prevented the improved competitiveness
from having full effects. Thus, only moderate gains in
market share were recorded.
The upturn in economic activity in 1983-1986, fuelled
by private consumption and investment, led to a tight
labour market, bottlenecks and upward pressure on
wages, Consequently, competitiveness was eroded in
the period 1986-87 and market shares were lost.
For the two decades as a whole, the weighted market
shares were almost constant as losses in industrial mar-
ket shares were offset by gains in the agricultural sector.
2.1.3 Country, product and prlce effects
In the longer term, producers should respond to changes
in market conditions and direct exports towards the more
profitable markets. Therefore, it may be relevant to also
look at unweighted market shares in current prices (al-
though industrialised countries normally tend to lose
shares in world markets to the fast growing developing
countries).
The difference between the weighted and unweighted
market shares may be broken down into a country effect,
a product effect and a price effect. If unweighted market
shares increase faster than the weighted market shares,
it may be taken as an indication that producers have
responded favourably to changes in market conditions.
However, as the unweighted market shares have de-
veloped substantially less favourably than the weighted
market shares for Denmark, some weakness in the over-
all competitive position is suggested. One reason for
this is that the greater part of Danish exports is directed
towards the European market, which has experienced
relatively slow growth within the OECD, except for the
most recent years. As to the product effect, Danish
exports have a relatively high specialization in agricul-
tural exports. Since the markets for agricultural pro-
ducts have shown less growth than the markets for
industrial products, this has negatively affected total
Danish exports, although both weighted and unweighted
shares have risen in these markets.
ln the second half of the 1980s, the country and product
effects have been more favourable. Consequently, un-
weighted market shares rose despite some losses of
weighted market shares. The positive product effect has
mainly been duc to relatively strong growth of markets
for furniture and pharmaceuticals, which form a signifi-
cant share of industrial exports.
Concerning price developments, Denmark suffered a
much shalper fall in the terms of trade during the 1970s
than the average of the Community (together with
France, Italy and Portugal). During the 1980s, when
most member countries enjoyed a rise in the terms of
trade (after an initial decline in 1981), Denmark enjoyed
virtually no incroase. As shown above, this decline in
the terms of trade does not have a counterpart in im-
proved competitiveness and strong gains in market
shares. The reason for this apparently unfavourable de-
velopment is that prices of agricultural products (in
particular animal products) rose much less than prices of
industrial products. Although this lends support to the
thesis that Denmark is disadvantaged by its specializa-
tion in agricultural products, it overlooks the fact that
productivity in the agricultural sector rose much faster
than productivity in industry in the past rwo decades.
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2.1.4 The structural trade balance
Exports and imports are not only affected by competi-
tiveness, but also b5l fluctuations in world demand, do-
mestic demand and terms of trade. Thus, a deficit may
be caused by a combination of high domestic demand
and low world market growth. In order to separate short
term effects on the trade balance stemming from fluctu-
ations in world demand, domestic demand and terms of
trade, a small model for the trade balance has been
estimated. The structural balance of uade in goods and
services is then defined by trended values of these
exogenous variables l. As shown in Graph 16, the devi-
ation between the structural and the actual balance was
quite substantial in the second halfofthe 1970s. Thus,
due to high domestic demand relative to world demand,
the trade balance deteriorated by some 3% of GDP. On
top of this, the terms of trade shock in 1973-74 caused a
deterioration of some 3.5?o of GDP 2.
It may be argued that there is no long-term trend in the
exogenous variables and in particular the terms of trade.
Therefore, one should not attribute too much emphasis
to long-term development of the structural balance; in-
stead attention should focus on short-term deviations of
the actual balance from the structural balance of trade
and services. The analysis underlines that a major rea-
son for the sharp deterioration in the extemal balance in
the second half of the 1970s was strong domestic demand
causedby an expansionary fiscal policy. The terms of
trade shock of 1973-74, weak world demand and dete-
riorating competitiveness (indirectly linked to the lax
fiscal policy) aggravated the situation. Finally, the in-
crease in real interest rates of the 1980s increased the
costs of the fiscal policy stance in terms of necessary
future adjustments.
2.2 Current account equilibrium: an
assessment of its appropriateness
This section provides an assessment of the relevance of
extemal equilib,rium - i.e. a balanced current account -
as a target for economic policy.
Assuming economies with efficient markets where pri-
vate agents have perfect foresight and public sector ac-
tivites are neutral, curent account imbalances simply
reflect the difference between the optimal intertemporal
saving and investment decisions of the private s€ctor.
Current account imbalances would mainly result from
cross-country asymmetries in:
a. the timc preferences of consumers
b.'demographic composition
c. growth rates
d. investment opportunities
e. external shocks
In this context all current account imbalances would be
equilibriu'n phenomena and easily financed at the inte.-
national real rate of interest.
An alternative way of viewing the saving-investment
relationship would be to specify saving as the sum of
investments and the balance of current transactions.
Given the time preferences of consumers in a specific
countr5/, aggregate saving may be directed towards do-
mestic investments and/or overseas (financial) invt st-
ments (or disinvestments). The more is invested
overseas, the better will the crurent account balance
perform. Therefore, a current account imbalance may be
taken to reflect a preferred way of capital accumulation.
This also highlights that a current account deficit need
not indicate a deterioration of the total wealth position
of a country; and total wealth could easily improve while
the current account balance is in deficit.
By collectinS taxes and spending the revenues, public
sectors most often distort private sector behaviour. To
the extent that the fiscal systems differ across countries,
current account balances are affected. Key elements in
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The method has been first used by Oto Ecksteiq 'The Great Recession with a Postcript on Sugflation", North-Hollan4 1978.
For the terms-of-trade adjustments, the normalizpd values are estimated by drmrmies in qder to cryture the three important
terms of aade shcks (1973-74 1980 ard 1986). Adjustments for these malx shocks are t}ren linearly reduced fiom the
initial strock effect to zero over five yers. It is this aszumption which causes 0re kinks in ttre stnrcural |alurce in 1973 md
1986.
(4)
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the fiscal system which might lead to current account
imbalances would be asymmetries in:
f. taxation of capital
g. business subsidies
h. social security systems, notably the pension
system
i. succession duties
By altering the cost as well as the yield of capital,
taxation of capital incomes as well as business subsidies
tend to distort equilibrium investments. Taxation of
capital incomes may in addition change the time profile
of consumption over the life-cycle, by affecting coruru-
mers' intertemporal rate of substitution. Finally, social
security systems and succession duties may, by eliminat-
ing motives for saving (i.e. precautionary, pension and
bequest motives), not only change the time profile of
saving, but the whole level of life time saving. There-
fore, the assessment of whether or not specific current
account imbalances should be of major concern in econ-
omic policy would involve examination of distortionary
effects of public sector activities on private sector beha-
viour. If such distortiorui are substantial, this could lead
to persistent and detrimental imbalances.
The assumptions of perfect foresight and efficient mar-
kets may, ho*erer, be unrealistic l. Io particular, the
capital market may be unable to alsess the default risk
of single enterprises properly; and the curent account
balance is therefore often used as an indicator of supply
problems. Thus, the rate of interest at which the single
firm or the government can borrow depends on the size
of the external debt (over which the single firm exercises
no control). A current account deficit, therefore, could
be a negative externality for the individual fimr.
In summary, the current account balance conveys im-
portant information for policy makers. Furthermore,
although public sector deficits may be of special relev-
ance for the assessment of the external balance, the
possibility of a sub-optimal level of private sector debt
should not be excluded.
2.3 Saving-investment balance and the current
account deficit
By definition the excess of export earnings over import
and net factor payments must equal national saving less
national investment. A study of the investment/saving
balance serves to widen the policy focus with respect to
the current balance as external competitiveness would
no longer be seen as a unique 6slsrmining factor
2.3.1 Evolutlon ol savlng and lnvestment:
an overvlew
The persistent curent account deficit may primarily be
ascribed to low national saving. Public saving has been
higher than the average of the Community during both
the 1970s and the 1980s except for a few years at the
beginning of the 1980s. Private saving, on the other
hand, has been significantly below the Community aver-
age during the whole period.
In the 1970s, the share of investment in GDP was no
higher than the Community average; however, in the
1980s the share has been somewhat lower than average.
A more detailed inspection of the investment data re-
veals that residential investment was significantly
higher in Denmark until the mid-1970s, but lower in the
1980s. This should be seen in the context of much lower
population growtfu while the Danish population grew by
a total of some 4?o daring the two decades, the popula-
tion of EUR12 rose by some 896.
Non-residential investment in Denmark has been slight-
ly lower than the Community average 2 during the iwo
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It might be argued that the aszumption of perfect foresight srd a full set of efficient mrkets contradicts the notion of no
Ricrdian oquivalence uderlying this analysis; if agenu hold perfect foresiglrt regarding private sector decisions, why do
they not hold perfect foresight regrding public sectq decisions? However, it need not be a contradiction. As private agents
may be unable to assess whe0rer cur€nt public lerding will lead to higher taxes within their expected life-time or nog 0rey
may not fully discount funue tax increases in their saving &cisions.
Due to lrck of data for EUR 12, Graph 18 shows EUR 7 (D + F+ I + UK + NL + B + DK).
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Old age pensions constitute an important part of all
social protecrion expenditures. In consequence, the
question of whether general provision of old age Pen-
sions affects private saving negatively has been an issue
of much debate. The life-cycle hypothesis suSSests that
people spend less than what they earn during their work-
ing age saving up mainly for pensions; in the last part of
their life the pension savings are being consumed. Im-
plementation of a state run general pension scheme
would certainly reduce the working-life savings as the
primary motive for savings diminishes or disappears.
However, on receiving pension Paym€nts, dissaving in
the old age will also be reduced. In long term equili-
brium, therefore, it is unlikely that aggregate private
saving will be significantly affected by a state-run old-
age pension scheme.
However, it is certain that a period of low private saving
will immediately follow the implementation of a general
old age pension scheme, since the desired stock of sav-
ings has been reduced; people will enter their retirement
with a stock of savings lower than previously by an
amount equal to the present discounted value of the state
provided pension payments. In a simple simulation
model, Sondergaard (1990) shows that the implied turn-
round in thc stock of private savings given the present
level of pension payments could be as high as 1 lr2 times
GDP or some 3 14 times the current external debt. To
the extent that public savings are not increased in com-
pensation, the net external position would deteriorate.
This deterioration would be aggravated by high domestic
demand and a jump in real wages.
Graph 19 reveals that although Denmark spends a larger
share of GDP on social protection than in the Community
on averag€, this share is not larger than for other high
income countries: Germany, France, Belgium and
decades. This is in line with expectations because the
catching-up of the southern member countries is charac-
terized by high investment.
In summary, the salientfeatures of the saving/investment
pattern during the last two decades are l) very high
residential investment during the 1970s followed by a
sharp reduction in the 1980s and 2) low private saving
throughout the whole period.
2.3.2 Determlnants of sectoral savlng/lnvestment
behavlour
The welfare state
The Danish state provides social security for its citizens
to a larger extent than many other Community countries;
risks, which in other countries are largely borne by
individuals, are borne by the State. This reduces the
motivation for precautionary savings. At the level of the
individual, however, these welfare risks have not disaP-
peared, but have merely been transformed into a risk of
higher taxes. Moreover, as concluded above, individ-
uals might underestimate this risk, and so negatively
affect the level of savings. Welfare states, therefore,
should seek a higher level of public savings (or a lower
level of public debt) to avoid a reduction of national
wealth.
It is important to recognize that welfare provision may
not by iself change the total life+ime saving of individ-
uals and therefore the long-term equilibrium private sav-
ing rate. [t is rather the stock of savings which may be
affected.
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Netherlands. None of these countries, however, suffered
from excessively low private saving duting the 1970s
and 1980s when welfare expenditures in general accel-
erated. High social protection expenditures, therefore,
can hardly be the only explanation for the mounting
external debt in Denmark.
Tax on interest incomes
One of the distortionary elements of the Danish fiscal
system is the taxation of net interest incomes. Nominal
interest incomes form a part of the personal incomes
base, which is taxed at relatively high marginal rates
(even after the 1987 tax reform the tax rate remains
significant at some 50%). This generates a wedge be-
tween the real rate of interest and consumers' marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution. Given the positive
correlation between nominal interest rates and inflation,
this implies a high tax burden on the real interest rates
during inflationary periods. As shown in Graph 4, the
gap between pre tax and net of tax real interest rates was
important in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s.
The combination of lower tax rates implied by the tax
reform of 1987 and lower inllation from the mid-1980s
onwards, however, has recently reduced the gap consid-
erably. Looking at the real rate of interest net of tax,
saving has been a rather unrewarding activity until the
mid-eighties, while the advanced purchase of consumer
durables has becn made relatively attractive.
The deductibility for interest payments is likely to have
led to excessive residential investment. As the imputed
rent on owner-occupied housing has been lower than real
interest rates, the yield reguired for making housing
investment profitable has becn lower than the market
rate of interest. During the first half of the 1970s,
residential investment constituted a substantial part of
GDP (some 9?o) even exceeding productive equipment
investment. As shown in Graph 18, this was much
higher than the average of the Corununity. The graph
also indicates that residential investrnent has recently
responded to lower inflation and the tax reform of 1987,
where the capital tax rate was significantly reduced.
Through capitalization of the expected future stream of
tax subsidies, high house prices also overstated the real
estate component of national wealth l, thus affecting
consumption. All in all, therefore, the tax treatment of
interest incomes and payments, by simultaneously
boosting residential investrnent and private consump-
tion, could explain a significant part of the low private
sector saving and thus the national external debt accu-
mulation. Moreover, high inflation considerably rein-
forced these distortions.
Business subsidies
Business subsidies affect investment decisions by reduc-
ing the user cost of capital. Thereby a given investment
becomes profitable at a yield below the market real rate
of interest (at which e.g. the foreign debt is financed).
Subsidization therefore reduces the equilibrium average
rate of rcturn on the capital stock; and a country that
relies heavily on subsidization will probably experience
a larger investment ratio at a given GDP growth rate
(consistent with a high capital/output ratio). Hence, at
a given saving ratio, heavy subsidization would lead to
a current account deterioration and possibly debt accu-
mulation.
Business subsidies may be divided into direct and indi-
rect subsidies. The latter category mainly consists of
favourable accounting principles and depreciation
schemes,
As shown in Table 2 the level of direct subsidies is quite
low in Denmark; indeed, the lowest in the Community.
Therefore, direct business subsidies should not be a vital
factor in the debt accumulation.
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Sourcc: EUROSTAT
1) S. Bo Nielsen urd J. Sondergaard 1990.
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Besides, as previously shown, the investment ratio in
Denmark has been realtively low for a number of years,
which also suggests that both direct and indirect invest-
ment subsidies are rather modest.
Moreover, the important reduction of the corporate tax
rate from 5O% to 4O9o in 1990 (and the proposed further
reduction to38?o this year) has decreased the tax value
of depreciations and other allowances, and hence the
possible distorting cffects.
Indirect subsidies, on the other hand, may have been
relatively more important in Denmark. In particular, the
depreciation scheme has been relatively generous. A
salient feature of the depreciation scheme is the allow-
ance for inflation i.e. the base of depreciation may be
increased according to inflation. As a result more than
the original investment may be depreciated during the
life-time of the investment r. Combined with full deduc-
tibility of interest expenditures, this leads to an increas-
ing level of indirect subsidy at increasing levels of
inflation z. The table below shows present values of the
depreciation schemes for a 15 years equipment invest-
ment in a number of member countries (computed on
1987 data) 3.
Present value of depreciation in percent of investment:
DKDNLBUK
10091 113 94 85
Another indirect subsidy is the possibility of depreciat-
ing inventories. This has led to a higher equilibrium
stock of inventories than for most other countries.
On the other hand there is no evidence that the Danish
system for depreciation on machinery, buildings and
inventories produces greater distortions than in most
other countries.
Preliminary results from a study taking place within
OECD (Devereux and Pearson) show that the Danish
tax-system does not distort investment decisions to any
greater degree than tax-systems in most other OECD-
countries.
Public sector saving
Public sector saving was relatively healthy in Denmark
until the mid-1970s. However, in the wake of the first
two oil price shocks, fiscal policy was loosened consid-
erably and the public sector balance deteriorated sharply.
Since 1982, a tight fiscal policy has been pursued and
the public sector balance has recovered somewhat' As
argued above, the relatively high degree of welfare pro-
vision calls for prudent management of the public finan-
ces. Indeed, it is notable that Denmark has a higher
(cyclically-adjusted) public sector balance than all other
member countries (see Graph 12 in Box 1.3 on fiscal
policy).
The Darish government has recently presented the parliament with a proposal to abolish the allowance for inflatiqr which
was one element of the political compromise on the Finance Bill for 191.
The recent reduction of the corporate tax rate from 5 Mo to 40lo has lessened this problem stenrming from a mix of a real and
anominal tax system,
P.B. Sorensert Afskrivningsregler, investeringer og udlandsgaeld, Okoromi og Politik,t-1988.
1)
2)
3)
Greph 20: Publlc sector gross dcb3
00
m
tlt
!0
l0
t0
0
?o7tn?n717578n ?0 7e 00 0l @ Es u 00 E6 G7 e0 Ee m 0l ca
Sura!'Calaaldao &ar6
Coolnidrlttut,nnt(Xot tUL)
. EIIRI0 - Hnfz Gld CE.!d P
htdGIP
24 Current acrount performance and external debt
However, the ability of the public sector to meet future
obligations not only depends on current saving; it also
depends on accumulated public debt. Denmark has a
public gross debt slightly higher than the Communiry
average'. However, given the high level of welfare
provision, the lowest possible level of debt is required.
Therefore, some further adjustments should be needed.
2.4 Stabilization of the debt
This section seeks to identify the major turning points in
the development of the current account balance and the
external debt during the last two decades and attempts
to quantify the requirements for stabilizing or reducing
the external debt.
2.4.1 The llnk between the current account balance
and external debt accumulatlon
Ideally, the change in the net external position should be
equal to the current account balance i,e. the absolute
level of the external debt should be the sum of all pre-
vious current account deficits. In practice, however, this
is not the case and in several years the current account
balance has deviated substantially from the change in the
external debt.
Debt accumulation deviates from the current account
balance because capital gains and losses are not regis-
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tered as income in the national accounts. For the net
external position of Denmark, on the other hand, some
effort is put into estimating capital gains and losses; in
particular, changes in the market value of stocks end
direct invcstment (both due to exchange rate changes and
domestic stock market changes) are accounted. Firstly,
this implies that if the currency depreciates (appreci-
ates), the external debt would tend to grow faster
(slower) than the current account deficit. Secondly,
changes in the composition of assets and liabilities
(among shares, bonds anddirect investments) may affect
the current account without inllucncing the change in the
external debt as dividends on direct investments and
shares usually are much lower than nominal interest
payments on bonds. Finalln changes in the share of high(low) yielding currencies in the external position may
also cause changes in the current account without
necessarily affecting the growth of the external debt; the
debt accumulation is unaffected because high (low) in-
terest rates are counterparts of crurency depreciation
(appreciation).
As suggested above, the difference between the change
in the net external debt and the current account balance
may be interpreted as income accruing to external invest-
ments other than recorded net interest payments, etc.
Graph 21 shows this (residually calculated) revaluation
of the external debt together with the recorded net inter-
est payments in percent of the net external debt (the
implicit rate of interest). This interest rate rose steadily
during the 1970s but stabilized at a level of some 1l%
from 1982. Revaluation of the effective exchange rate
led to substantial capital gains in the first half of the
1970s; but erosion of competitiveness during the remain-
der of the decade gradually weakened the DKR and a
series of devaluations were carried out from 1979 to
1982. This raised the level of debt as the foreign cur-
rency debt was translated into a weaker DKR. Finally,
the recent hard currency stance has facilitated a return
of substantial capital gains on the external debt.
The two major components of the current account bal-
ance are the trade and services balance and net interest
payments. In the period until 1975, the trade and ser-
vices balance was negative to the tune of 0-3% of GDP
(see Graph 5) and the external debt grew only moderate-
ly as capital gains on the external debt counterbalanced
the interest payments. The major part of the external
debt was accumulated in the period from 1975 to 1983,
firstly due to a large deficit in the trade and services
balance and later due to high interest payments and
substantial capital losses on the external debt. Although
the trade and services balance deteriorated somewhat
from 1983 to 1986, a further increase in the debt was
prevented by capital gains stemming mainly from the
hard currency stance. Finally, recent improvements in
1 ) Denmrk has a relatively large readily marketable financial asset. The figures shorra may therefore to sorne extent over$tate
the tnre relative debt bwdens.
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trade performance have led to some alleviation in the
debt burden.
2.4.2 Requlrements for and costs of debt
stablllzatlon
To stabilize the ratio of external debt to GDP, the current
account excluding net interest Payments etc. (i.e. the
balance of trade and services plus income transfers), z,
must satisfy the following identity ':
z=(r-g)*d
where:
r = the real rate of interest
8 = the real growth rate of GDP
d = debt/GDP
Graph 22 shows what stabilization at a level of 4O9o
implies for the trade balance, etc. given alternative
growth rates and real interest rates. Points above
(below) the lines imply increasing (decreasing)
debt/GDP. Thus, at zero growth and a real rate of interest
of 7-89o a trade surplus etc. of some 3Vo of GDP is
required for debt stabilization. As pointed out above, it
is important that net interest Payments be consolidated
taking account of the revaluation of the debt, which in
recent years has led to annual gains in the order of 17o
of GDP.
The actual balance of trade and services plus income
transfers rose strongly from zero in the mid-1980s to
some 34% in the late 1980s. This improvement was
achieved mainly because the growth ratc of GDP fell
from some 4% in the mid-1980s to about l% in 1989-90.
At the present real rate of interest of about 7?o, the
combination of a trade surplus etc. of 3 -4% and a growth
rate of about 1% is consistent with stabilization of the
debt. As a further widening of the trade surplus etc. is
forecast, the debt level should continue on downward
trend despite low growth rates (even zero growth) and
high real rates of interest.
The costs of stabilization may be measured in terrts of
the ouput required to bring about a combination of
growth and trade surplus etc. consistent with stabiliza-
tion. Taking the period from 1985 to 1988 as the period
of debt stabilization, Denmark has suffered a cumulative
output loss against Germany of l% and of almost 37o
against the Community.
2.5 Concluding remarks and prospects
The root of the external debt problem has be€n traced
back to the period between the frst two oil price shocks.
While the terms of trade rumbled and external demand
was weak, domestic demand was high as pay rises accel-
erated (outpacing inflation) and fiscal policy was lax. [n
addition, competitiveness deteriorated mainly due to ex-
change rate appreciation. Nevertheless, although the
current account deficit widened strongly in these years,
external debt as a percentage of GDP rose only moder-
ately. However, when real interest rates soared in the
1980s the extemal debt accelerated sharply despite some
tightening of domestic policies and improving competi-
tiveness. Moreover, revaluation of the external debt
added substantially to the debt problem from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s.
Although Danish exports in volume terms have main-
tained their share in all export markets, the overall
growth of Danish exPorts has been somewhat below the
growth of world imports as country and product effects
have been relatively unfavourable. Assessed by the de-
velopment ofrelative prices, the high share of agricultu-
ral exports in total exports aPPears to have been
unfavourable. However, as productivity Srew much fas-
ter in the agricultural sector than in industry, the relative
specialization in agricultural exports may not have been
so disadvantageous.
From the study of saving and investment it may be
concluded that residential investment was excessive
until the mid-1970s due to strong effective subsidization
of housing. Likewise, private saving has been low as the
tax system caused a wide gap between the real rate of
interest and consumers'marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution, this gap being much affected by high infla-
tion. These are probably the most imPortant reasons for
the build-up of external debt during the 1970s and 1980s.
1) SeeW. Godley trdc.7*zz\1989.
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The analysis suggests that structural and institutional
differences between countries have implications for the
appropriate level ofpublic sector deficits and the level
of public debt. As private sector savings and investment
behaviour depend upon the overall institutional Betting,
the public sector has to take into consideration these
decisions in order to definc the long run equilibrium
level of public sector savings.
For the medium term outlook, the analysis indicates that
the current account balance will remain on a positivc
trend. Notably the lower rare of inflarion (implied by
the hard currency stance) and the 1987 tax reform has
reduced distortions in private sector saving and invest-
ment decisions. As a result, saving will increase while
investment projects will be subject to tighter screening,
with low yielding projects being cancelled. The change
in saving/invesiment incentives is realized only grad-
ually by agents. Therefore, the full effects of the change
may take years to materialize.
Moreover, the analysis on the welfare stste concluded
that by increasing social protection, the private sector
saving rate will temporarily drop until a lower level of
savings has been achieved. Social protection expendi-
tures were strongly expanded in the 1960s and 1970s.
As the ensuing savings adjustment is being completed,
one should expect the saving rate to recover. Therefore,
provided that fiscal policy remains tight, total national
saving is likely to expand faster than investment, im-
plying a sustained reduction in the external debt.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DANISH TAX SYSTEM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Introduction
The structure of the Danish tax system differs strongly
from the pattern of other Community countries, and in
some respects is not consistent with the Internal Market
Programme. In the face of European lntegration, there-
fore, there is a need for future fiscal reform. This chapter
examines the challenges, in terms of fiscal approxima-
tion, which Denmark faces in the process of European
integration.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section one out-
lines the main characteristics of the Danish tax structure
and shows the differences compared with other Com-
munity countries. Section two deals with one important
issue of fiscal approximation - indirect tax harmoniza-
tion. In this section, an attempt is also made to quantify
the likely macroeconomic effects of compliance with the
latest Commission proposal on indirect tax harmoniza-
tion. It is shown that the short and medium-term effects
on domestic demand of reduced indirect taxes could be
quite strong and that this may jeopardize the policy
objective ofreducing the external debt burden. Section
three, therefore, discusses various means for conrolling
the incipient rise in domestic demand while section four
summarizes and draws some conclusions.
3.1 The tax structure in Denmark
The current receipts of governmet (in % of GDP) rose
substantially during the 1980s, outpacing growth in all
other Community countries. Whereas the level of gov-
ernment receipts in 1980 was only third highest in the
Community, after Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and
some I 1 percentage-points higher than the average ofthe
Community, the level in 1989 was second to none and
some 15 percentage-points higher than the Community
auer.ge l.
Direct taxes appear to explain most of the difference
between the current govemment receipts in Denmark
and the rest of the Community. However, a sharp distinc-
tion betw€en direct taxes and social security contribu-
tions is not always appropriate. Social security
contributions are taxes on labour incomes, whether paid
by employers or employees. The major part of direct
taxes is also levied on labour income. On taking the sum
of direct taxes and social security contributions it
becomes clear that a prominent feature of the tax struc-
ture in Denmark relative to other Community countries
is the high level of indirect taxation. This is Particularly
true against bordering Germany.
3.2 Fiscal approximation
The logic of the internal market suggests that taxation of
goods should be harmonized with due respect to the
mobility of the goods. The Commission has Put forward
I ) Total governmentreceipts, in general, overstat€ the overall tax pressure - srd more so fu Denmart than for most other
Commrmity counries - as they i.a irrclude income transfers from abrosd (FEOGA) as well as interest and dividend incomes
on public assets. On the other han{ tlre denominatc, GDP, serves O bias the calculation towards a too low measure.
Reducing GDP for indirect taxes and net facEor payments abroad (both itenrs are more significant for Denmark than for other
Commrmity countries) yields a measwe - Gross Factor Income at factor cost - which is closer !o the "tnre potential tax bose"
(Skutepolitisk Redegoerelse, 1990)
Tlbte 3: Trr rtructure le Denmerl, Gcrmeny end EURO'
1rt9 - 96 of GDP -
D EURI2
l. Toal current receipts Sg.2 45.4 43.5
2. Indirect taxes lg.O 12.5 l3.z
3. Direct taxes 3O.4 lZ.4 12.4
4. Social security contribution 23 fi.z 14.4
5.3 + 4 32.7 29.6 2i.B
6. Other culent receipts 7.6 3.3 3.4
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proposals on indirect tax harmonization which implics
substantial tax reductions on the part of Denmark.
Therefore, reducing indirect taxes constitutes one of the
most important policy challenges facing Denmark in the
1990s. Below we outline the budgetary impact based on
the Commission's 1987-proposal of indirect tax har-
monization l. Do" to the perceived graviqr of the mac-
roeconomic corurequences, th}s section contains a rather
detailed account of the budgetary impacts, and simula-
tions are run on the official macrocconometric model,
ADAM, to explore the likely effects on key macroscon-
omic variables and balances.
3.2.1 Indlrect tax harmonlzatlon
For simulation purposes, tax harmonization is seen to be
carried out with effect from 1991. The impact effect is
thus calculated on the basis of the projected composition
of demand in that year. The projection is supplied by the
statistical bureau in Copenhagen, Danmarks Statistik, as
part of the base line scenario of the macroeconometric
model.
Harmonization of the VAT rates
The Commission proposals 2 are for the introduction of
a two-rate VAT system; a standard rate of no less than
l44o (or l5%) and a minimum rate of 4-97o. The latter
will be applied on a range of basic necessities.
This new regime would in principle allow Denmark to
retain the present (unitary) rate of 227o for the major part
of private consumption. For basic necessities, however,
the rate would have to be reduced from229o to 9?o or
less. In calculating the impact effect of this reduction,
the following commodiry groups are considered to be
subject to the lower rate: all food products including
non-alcoholic beverages, encrgy for light and heating,
water, medicine, passenger transport, newspapers, books
and magazines.
Reducing VAT on the above mentioned goods for private
consumption is estimated to cause an immediate budge-
tary loss of the order of some L.Z?o of GDP in l99l 3.
The standard rate of 22?o is assumed to be retained on
the remaining VAT-base.
It could be argued that a standard rate of 229o would
imply a too large gap against Germany and thus cause an
intolerably high level of cross-border trade a. A reduc-
tion of the standard rate to 20% would lead to an addi-
tional revenue loss of some 0.5% of GDP. Moreover, it
should be mentioned that the special social security tax
implemented in 1988 to promote exports to a large extent
resembles VAT. The revenue from this VAT-like social
security contribution amounts to some 1.5% of GDP.
Thus, it may be argued that the standard VAT rate is
closer to 25% than 22%. Denmark has been brought
before the European Court in relation to this social se-
curity contribution, as the Commission holds that it
violates the VAT-directive. Against this background, the
stated budgetary losses may be considered as a minimum
scenario. On the other hand, recent decisions/discus-
sions in Germany to increase its indirect taxes serves to
reduce the need for adjustments in Denmark.
As VAT is calculated on the top of excises a reduction of
the latter will automatically lead to a fall in the former,
This is estimated to cause an immediate budgetary loss
of some 0.29o of GDP. For the model simulation, how-
ever, this is an indirect shock, since it follows immedi-
ately from the reduced excise duties.
Teble 4: Budgetery lmprct effect of lndlrect tex
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Alcohol and tobacco
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HGO, HFO, LPG
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-3.3
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1)
2)
3)
4)
The issue is not the proposal itself, but only its impact on the Danish economy i.e. the conclusions are based on the premise
that Denmark actually follows the proposal. The final compromise may in sorne respecs deviate from this proposal.
However, this needs not invalidate the analysis below as Denrnrk in any case will havc to reduce indirect taxes substmtially.
Taken o include the amendments of the Conrmrmication to the Council of May 19E9, which suggest that the upper limit on
the standard rate be removed.
A breakdown of this budgetary loss on subgroups of private consrmrption is shown in box below.
Recent disctssions within the Gernrur govemment suggests that the German VAT-rate will be increased in the coming yeas.
Needless o say this may significmtly reduce the need for ajrdsrnens on the part of Denmrk
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Harmonization of excise duties
On heating gas oil (HGO), heavy fuel oil (HFO) and
liquified petroleum gas (LPG) the proposal sets maxi-
mum levels for excise duties well below the present
Danish rates. These excises should be reduced by more
than 707o on averago, leading to a budgetary loss of some
O.4% of GDP l. Electricity and coal does not form part
of the proposal. Therefore, it should not, in principle,
be necessary to lower the excise duty on electricity.
However, to some limited extent, electricity is used for
heating. Thus, it may be wished to lower the excise duty
on electricity for reasons of internal comPetition.
Another substitute for the above-mentioned energy sour-
ces is natural gas, which is distributed by public utilities
at a price equivalent to the price of heating gas oil
including excises. Any budgetary loss which may be
caused by a reduction in the excise duty on heating gas
oil and therefore in prices of natural gas, however, is
disregarded in the present analysis, as it is not included
in the proposal.
Although the excise duty on diesel is relatively high by
European standards and some l57o higher than the pro-
posed rate, the revenue from the tax on diesel is fairly
low becauso the duty is deductible when used conrmer-
cially 2. It is assumed that this facility will be disconti-
nued. Harmonization of this item, therefore, would not
lead to a budgetary loss. On the contrary, it would lead
to additional revenue, which is estimated at some 0.37o
of GDP. The real oconomy will be affected by increased
production costs in the branches concerned.
For petrol, the excises were lowered substantially in
1990 and are now in line with the proposal. Therefore,
no further reduction should be necessary for petrol
duties.
For tobacco and alcoholic beverages, the proposals only
set minimum rates, So, in principle, Denmark could
retain its present rates. To avoid a dramatic rise in
border trading, however, excise rates are assumed to be
reduced to a level compatible with retail prices for to-
bacco and spirits l0% above corresponding German
prices'. It is assumed that Germany, for its part, will
adjust excise duties with minor revenue implications.
The lowcr excise duties on tobacco and alcoholic bever-
ages are estimated to cause an immediate budgetary loss
of some 0,97o of GDP for Denmark.
Finalln it should be mentioned that the proposals abolish
tax free shopping for intra EC travelling. This is likely
to increase tax revenue only marginally as, among other
things, the value of the licence to sell tax frec at Kastnrp
airport would fall.
All in all, indirect tax harmonization is estimated to
cause a direct and irnmediate budgetary loss of some
2.2% of GDP 4. This is slightly lower than previous
estimates by the Commission services for several rea-
sons. Firstly, in recent years, indirect tax pressure has
already been reduced somewhat. Secondln since 1986
private consumption has decreased steadily in real terms
as well as in percentage of GDP. Finalln the present
specification of the budgetary imPact effects is made for
model simulations so that only direct simulation shocks
are taken into account.
Simulation results
The indirect tax changes which are applied in the simu-
lation are shown in table 4 and the effects on the main
economic variables are shown in table 5 below.
The figures shown in table 5 indicate how much the
economic variables are likely to deviate from their base-
run values if indirect taxes are cut.
A flow chart of the main channels of transmission is
shown in graph 23. In the first place, demand is affected
through a jurnp in private consumPtion. The cut in
indirect taxes causes a once-off rise in real disposable
incomes due to a drop in consumer prices. Mo"5 ef th;s
gain is transmitted into higher real private consumptiorr
during the first year. Other demand components, how-
ever, will add considerably to growth in the second year.
Notably residential investment is seen to accelerate
sharply, so that after four years residential investment
should be some 28?o higher than in the base run.
Residential investment is in the model, mainly d-':r-
mined by a variant of Tobin's Q'. As the market price of
existing houses rise above the replacement costs, i.e. the
price for a new house, replacement becomes more inter-
esting. The price of existing houses, in turn, is much
affected by fluctuations in the real disposable incomes.
Thus, due to the jump in real disposable incomes, the
price ofhouses accelerates sharply which, in turn, trig-
gers a surge in residential investment.
1)
2l
3)
4l
It is rgued below that energy excise duties may be subetinrtod by a tax levied on a meter installed at the place of
consumption
The branches of road uursport and agriculnre aocormt for the major part of this refun4 so that only thqse nro branches have
been affected in the simulations below.
The most recent increase in the excise duty on cigarettes in Germany (1 pfermig per cigrette) - with effect as from Janury
1992 - has not been taken ino rccotmt
If, in addition, we assume lowering of the standard VAT to 20?o, abolition of the VAT-like social sectrity contribution,
reduction of excise duties on electricity as well as take into consideration 0re fall in VAT qr excise duties, one could arrive at
a figure close o 57o of GDP. This, however, would not change the general conclusion of the simulatiorl although the
macroeconomic effecs would be even more prcnormced'
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Teble 5: f,.esults of Slmuletlon : lndlrect trxca cut
by 22% ofGDP
l99l 1992 t993 t994
% &viationfronrbsserun
Main economic variablcs:
1. cDP (volume)
2. Imports (volumc)
3. Exports (volume)
4. Private consumption
(volume)
5. Groes lixed capital
forrn (volunre)
6. Hourly wages in
industry
7. GDP deflator
8. Private consumption
dcflator
9. Export deflator
10. Rate of uncmployment
External balance:
ll. Trade balance
12, Current account
Public sector:
13. Unemployment benelit
14. Indirect taxes
15. Current expenditures
16. Current receipts
17. Public sector balance
-0.8 -0.9 -0.3 0.9
-0.6 -1.4 -2.0 -2.2
% &viationfronrbase-run
(% of GDP)
2.7
2.7
0.3
6.6
2.3
{.8
3.7
3.6
o.7
5.5
6.6
-t.2
4.t 4.9
5.3 5.7
0.8 0.7
8.5 9.1
t2.6
-3.7 -3.9 -2_9 -0.8
-6.2 -6.3 -5.9 -4.6
-l. t
-0.9
-0.2
-1.7
0.3
-1.3
-1.6
-1.3
-t.2
-0.5 -o.7
-1.5 -1.4
-0.6 -1.6
-1.2 -1.2
-0.6 0.4
-1.6 -1.6
-1.6 -1.7
-0.8
-1.5
-2.t
-1.2
0.9
(l ) The various components (groups) of private consump-
tion are affected according to their respective income
and price elasticities and according to how much their
retail prices have been cut. The simulation indicates
that the most profound volume effects can be expec-
ted for consumption of alcohol and tobacco (up to
347o) for cars (up 22?o) and for energy (up 20%).
Provided that the budgetary effects will be counrerba-
lanced by higher social security contributions and
lower nominal transfer paymenB, however, the rise in
consumption of alcohol and tobacco as well an energy
can to some extent b contained.
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Finally, it should be noted that there is an important
feedback from house prices to private consumption.
Changes in the net-wealth of the households are seen ro
affect private consumption strongly. As house prices
form a part of the wealth term, the acceleration of the
former serves to augment the initial boost to private
consumption.
The first round effect on the consumer price deflator
mentioned above is to a large extent mechanical. Enter-
prises are assumed to let the indirect tax reductions be
fully reflected in lower salcs prices. The supply side of
the model, however, produces significant second round
effects on prices. Firstly, tax changes are assumed to
have a direct effect on wage claims. Therefore, indirect
tax-cuts via the implied lower consumer prices initiate a
downward pr€ssure on wages. This reduces unit labour
costs and brings about a further decline in consumer
prices as well as the GDPdeflator. Secondly, a higher
level of production and employment tightens the labour
market. This in turn triggers higher wage claims. The
first effect dominates in the short term (the first two
years) while the second dominates thereafter.
As export prices are endogenous in the model, deter-
mined as a mark-up over production costs, changes in
wage claims are allowed to pass through into export
prices. Thus, given the growth of export markets and
nominal exchange rates, and keeping in mind the above
mentioned wage scenario (implying an immediate fall
due to the tax cuts), growth in the volume of exports
accelerates somewhat in the first two years. In the
longer term, however, as the labour market tightens due
to the strong demand effects of the tax cuts, higher
general wage claims pass through to export prices and
put a brake on exports. The simulation shows that the
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initial boost to exports is offset already by the fourth
year.
As regards the labour market, the simulation highlights
the risk of running into severe bottlenecks. Unemploy-
ment would be reduced by some 0.6% (of the labour
force) in the first year and by some 2.2% in the course
of the next three years. The rise in employment will be
particularly pronounced in the construction sector,
where almost 30% of total job creation within the first
four years will take place. This implies a rise of some
lL-12?o in employment in the sector.
The strong rise in domestic demand has a powerful effect
on the external current account. The trade balance
shows a first year deterioration of some 1.17o of GDP.
The tourist balance, however, should improve as lower
consumer prices attract visitors from abroad. Therefore,
the current account deteriorates by less than the trade
balance, i.e. by 0.97o of GDP. As domestic demand
accelerates, the current account deficit widens and leads
to an accumulation of foreign debt, which in turn exacer-
bates the deterioration in the current account balance. In
the fourth year, the current account balance may have
deteriorated by some 1.7% of GDP against the base run.
Assessed against the background of an already heavy
burden of servicing the existing external debt, this fea-
ture of the scenario is particularly significant.
The public sector balance is shown to nrn a substantial
deficit in the first year. However, as economic activity
accelerates and real private consumption and employ-
ment rise, government receipts rebound somewhat.
More importantly, however, government expenditures
drop significantly during the simulation period mainly
due to a substantial reduction in unemployment, a fall in
prices of goods consumed by the public sector and a
slight reduction in nominal wages as well as transfer
payments. By the third year, the effect on the public
sector balance is already positive.
This scenario should be assessed against a background
of the likely state of the economn if no policy changes
occur. In particular, it is important to assess the employ-
mentfirnemployment scenario against the likely labour
market situation in 1991-1994, given no tax cuts. Un-
employment is currently on a slightly upward trend and
(according to the national definition) is likely to average
some 914-10Vo in 1991. As the rise in labour supply is
expected to remain modest in the medium term, even low
growth rates would ensure that unemployment does not
accelerate. Considering that evidence points to substan-
tial structural rigidities in the labour market, the scena-
rio, which implies a fall in the rate of unemployment of
some 2,2?o, is hardly compatible with non-accelerating
wa8es. On the contrary, the economy may rapidly run
into bottlenecks and experience a vicious wage-price
acceleration. Notably in residential construction w88e
pressures may build up strongly.
Long term effects
The simulation above showed that the negative impact
on the public sector balance of indirect tax cuts will be
counterbalanced by strong cyclical effects. This result,
however, applies only in the short and medium term. In
the longer term, higher wage clairns will reduce demand
firstly by crowding out net exports. Then, unemploy-
ment will rise again while domestic demand contracts,
For the public sector balance this will simultaneously
cause an increase in expenditure and a reduction in
receipts. Drawing on the conclusions of Chapter 2, the
most important long-term effect of the indirect tax cuts
is likely to be higher external debt. Public services must
eventually be paid for, but the private sector will not
fully discount future tax increases and/or cuts in public
services by higher current saving. The lower public
sector net saving will therefore increase the current ac-
count deficit. It is assumed here that labour supply and
the equilibrium level of unemployment will not be af-
fected by the policy shock. The validity of this sssump-
tion is discussed below.
Tax cuts and the Laffer curve
It is generally recognized that macroeconometric simu-
lations can be misleading when large shocks are con-
sidered, because fundamental changes may occur in tt"'
the behaviour and expectations of agents (viz the Luc"s
critique). The shock we consider here is indeed very
substantial. Therefore, we should not attribute too much
significance to the actual figures. The value of the
exercise lies in identifying the fundamental policy chal-
lenge.
Considering the high tax pressure in Denmark one mrght
consider whether cutting taxes would significantly im-
prove the supply of labour. This depends on whether the
substitution effect of lowering taxes may dominate the
income effect i.e. whether Denmark is situated beyond
the peak of the Laffer curve l. Indeed, if there is any
practical relevance to the Laffer curve it would prescribe
tax cuts as a means of increasing tax-revenue in Den-
mark. However, Denmark seems to be nowhere near the
peak of the Laffer curve. Thus, Nina Smith (1986)
reports the elasticity of labour supply w.r.t. gross wages
to be 0.8 for married women and 0.5 for married men.
More recent studies by Nina Smith (1990) suggest, how-
ever, that the elasticity of the male labour supply with
respect to after tax-income is higher than that of the
female labour supply, but still far too low to ensurc that
tax reductions lead to a higher tax revenue.
1) A p,roposition that increased tax rates would only bring about a larger tax rev€nue up to a certain point from where the
substinrtion effect will dominate the income effect and generate a falling revenue.
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Tax cuts and hence indirect tax harmonisation should,
therefore, not be viewed as a kind of "free lunch", sim-
ultaneously alleviating most macroeconomic imbalan-
ces. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that tax cuts
might to some extent be self-financing and that the
model simulation above may be too pessimistic in not
allowing for increased labour supply and wage moder-
ation.
Need for additional policy measures
Even though the proposed cha.ge in tax structure could
be more successful in terms of increased labour supply
and wage moderation than suggested by the model simu-
lation, additional policy measures designed to dampen
domestic demand are needed in order to ensuro a bal-
anced economic development. It should also be men-
tioned that the model scenario is the minimum tax
adjustment required if the tax-harmonisation proposal is
to be implemented in Denmark.
One measure which deserves particular attention (being
a close substitute for proposed cuts in excise duties) is a
tax on energy use. The Danish government is much
concerned with energy saving and therefore worried
about the increase in energy consumption, which is like-
ly to result from lower retail prices of energy. Consider-
ation could be given to levying an energy tax through to
a meter installed at the place of consumption. Thus,
private households could buy the fuel oil at the most
competitive prices and be taxed later when the oil is
actually used for heating. Such a tax could be set at a
level correspouding to uuchanged (effective) energy
prices and therefore raise the same revenue as will be
lost due to lower excise duties i.e. 0.4% of GDP.
A number of other possible measures are briefly dis-
cussed iu the sections below.
3.3 Policy options to control domestic demand
Considering the magnitude of the demand stimulus from
the indirect tax harmonisation and the gravity of the
external debt problem (discussed in chapter 2), it is
imperative to implement other strong measures to con-
tain the rise in domestic demand. Lower indirect taxes
lead to increased purchasing power for all incomes:
labour incomes, transfer incomes and capital incomes.
Neutralizing the purchasing power effect of lower indi-
rect taxes may be achieved by reducing the after-tax
value of all ttuee incomes in line with the lower con-
sumer prices. Transfer incomes are set centrally and
may therefore be the easiest to adjust.
3.3.1 Hlgher soclal securlty contrlbutlons
Reducing the purchasing power of labour incomes could
be accomplished by higher social securiry contriburiom.
However, substituting social security taxes for indirect
taxes may not b€ an easy task. High taxation on labour
is often held to pose a problem in the context ofinterna-
tional migration. This would suggest that the sum of
income taxes and social security contributions should
not be significantly higher than in surrounding countries.
So far, migration flows to and from Denmark have been
rather modest. Nevertheless, if social security contribu-
tions are increased significantly, this will bring total
labour taxes in Denmark well above those in the sur-
rounding countries thus increasing the risk of migra-
tion '. Moreover, the impact of European integration on
labour migration is yet to emerge. Hence, from this
point of view there are narrow limits upon the magnitude
ofpotential increases in social securiql hxes.
Higher social security contributions would affect com-
petitiveness and thereby the current account balance
negatively if wage claims are not reduced simultaneous-
ly. Therefore, if revenue is to be switched from indirect
taxes to social security contributions without strong ne-
gative effects on the curent account balance, it is essen-
tial that lower consumer prices be reflected fully in
lower wage claims. This would leave product wages
unaffected.
Whether or not wage and salary earners will accept lower
pay rises for lower indirect taxes can be seen as a game
theoretical question. A successful outcome would de-
pend much on the credibility of the policy. Due to rhe
tight external constraint, there is no roomfor the govern-
ment to start the game by reducing indirect taxes. There-
fore, the labour market would have \o show wage
moderation before indirect taxes are cut. Wage moder-
ation, in turn, would depend on the credibility of the
government policy. A precondition would be that the
policy of increasing social security contriburions and
cutting indirect taxes is clearly ennounc€d before wage
talks. Previous experience does not provide much
grounds for optimism for a successful outcome in this
regard.
Clearly announcem€nt of the indirect tax cuts (and poss-
ibly negotiation with the social partners) is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for achieving wage moder-
ation. It will also be required to phase in the tax cuts
over a longer period of time: an abrupt change would
probably lead to a once-off drop in the consumer price
index, which is unlikely to be followed by a similar fall
in nominal wages.
1 ) Some meditmr and highec inoome eamers already seern to pay somewhat higher fuEome.taxes qrd social security
contibutions than in other EC-oounuies (Skasepolitisk Redegoerelse 190). The incentive o emigrarc would therefqe seem
panicularly high fu these irrcome groups.
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3.3.2 Hlgher capltal taxes
The tax rate on nominal interest incomes and dividends
in Denmark, although recently lowered significantln is
still high by European standards and may be difficult to
sustain without a Commrt"ity-wide reporting system,
due to increased capital mobility. Moreover, in Chapter
2 we concluded that the high tax rate on (net) nominal
interest incomes mry have led to low Private net saving
especially in inflationary times. There is, therefore, no
case for a higher tax rate on capital incomes. However,
other capital taxes, such as proPerty taxes, could be
increased. The logic of the internal market would sug-
gest that the less mobile factors of production should be
taxed highest. The least mobile of all production factors
is land. For households, higher land taxes will squeeze
their real disposable incomes as well as their net wealth.
The latter is a direct consequenc€ of the present value of
taxes being affected fully in the market price of land.
Hence, both by affecting disposable incomes and by
affecting real wealth, higher land taxes will put down-
ward pressure on private consumption.
For farmers higher land taxes will reduce annual in-
comes as well as the market price of the farms. In a
transition period, therefore, special provisions may have
to be made for farmers. However, for those who buy a
farm after land taxes have been increased, a lower debt
service burden - due to the lower market price of land -
will neutralize the higher land taxes.
3.3.3 Reduced publlc expendlture
Public expenditure, measured against GDB is well above
the EC average and higher than in any other Community
member country, A reduction in public spending thus
constitutes I third alternative. A reduction of the public
sector vis-I-vis the private sector would also be consist-
ent with the aim of government policies, which e.g.
include that productivity gains in the public sector ma-
terialize as lower expenditure and public employment
rather than increased public service.
3.4 Summary of conclusions
The Danish tax-slructure is shown to deviate strongly
from the Community sverage. Notabln much higher
indirect taxes than neighbouring Germany are shown to
pose an immediate problem in the cont€xt of the Internal
Market Programme. The necessary cuts in indirect
taxes, partly laid down in the Commission proposal for
indirect tax harmonisation, is estimated to imply a
budgetary loss of more thrn2% of GDP. Without sccom-
panying measures to contain the incipient surge in do-
mestic demand, a stimulus of this order is likely to lead
to severe labou markct tightness rnd a substantial dete-
rioration in the currcnt account brlance. The initial
deterioration in the public sector balance would in the
short to medium-term be reversed due to strong cyclical
effects. But in the long-terrr, unemployment will return
to a more stable level (reflecting current structural rig-
idities) and the public s€ctor balance will deteriorate.
Furthermore, as lower public sector saving will not be
matched by higher private sector saving, the currenl
account balance will worsen and the external debt will
accelerate. Therefore, the necessary cuts in indirect
taxes should be accompanied by increases in other taxes
and/or spending cuts. A number of possibilities are dis-
cussed.
Lower indirect taxes lead to increased purchasing Power
for all incomes: labour incomes, transfer incomes and
capital incomes. Neutralizing the purchasing power ef-
fect may be achieved by reducing the after-tax value of
these income categories in line with the lower consumer
prices. Transfer incomes may be the least troublesome
to adjust. Regarding capital taxes, the tax rate on inter-
est incomes is already very high in the EuroPean context;
but other capital taxes, such as ProPerty taxes, could in
principle be increased.
Finally, higher social security contributions could serve
to neutralize the purchasing Power effect on labour in-
comes. However, substitution of social security con-
tributions for indirect taxes may be difficult to
implement without adverse effects on competitiveness.
Moreover, a much higher tax burden on labour incomes
could lead to emigration of especially highly skilled
labour and to the extent that the marginal tax rates are
increased, the overall labour market flexibility could be
even further reduced and thus impede future growth
prospocB: these considerations serv€ to illustrate that
the room for increasing tsxes on labour incomes is nar-
row.
34 The Danbh taxsystem and europen integration
BADCBN
The consuner goods subject to reduced VAT are coatairud
in the followittg private consunption grcups in ADAM:
The impact effect is calculated by multiptying tle forecast
VAT revenuc for tlv particular consumption group by the
of goods subject to reduccd VAT and tlrr tate-reduc-
tion (i.e. 13t22).
or two StouPs,
" 
the parts somewlwt
from this simple formula:
Newspapers are currently subject to zero-vAT. According
to the Conunission proposal ,Ewspapers will be subject to
reduced VAT. This would raise tla VAT-base atd therefore
lead to a rarcnue gain. In accordatrce with previous calcu-
latiortt by thc national authorities, this gain is put at 0.2 bn
D KR. N ew spapers form p art of the ADAM - grcup C I : othcr
rpn-durables.
Public transoort is currently rot subject toVAT at all. This
mearut that VAT on input cannot be deducted and refunded,
Making public transport subject to reduced VAT as pro-
posed by the Commission would, according to previous
calculations by the national authorities, lead to a ncgative
VAT-base because sales will be multiplied by 9% whereas
inputs can be deducted on the basis of a somewhat highet
rate (on average), As, however, this budgetary impact
should, cause no real economic effect, it is excluded from
the present analysis. The rcgative budgetary effect will
show up as a reduced deficit on public transport.
The sante approach is takzn with regards public consump-
tion. The tugative budgetary effects of reduced VM on
public consumption is seen to have no real ecotomic ef-
lects. Therefore, it is disregarded in the ptesent analysis.
CE: Energn ctc.
(cxcl.encrgy for transport)
CF: Fod productr
CI: Othernon-durablcr
CK: Public transport, ctc.
CN: Alcohol and tobacco, ctc.
Total
tw% 6.4 0.Tl
t7% 0.5 0.06
65% 0.4 0.05
8% 0.2 0.v2
26% 9.9 l.l9
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Table 1: Maln economlc lndlcators
929l9089EE87E685848382E1
GDP at constant 1985 pricce, urnual
% change
Denmart
ET,JR-I2
GDP pcr head (in PPS index EUR-
l2=100)
Total employnrcnt, annual % changc
Denmark
EI.JR.I2
GDP dcflator, annual % changc
Denmart
EUR.I2
Unemploymeot tate, .b of civilian
working population
Denmark
Denmark (EUROSTAT)
Er,rR-I2 (EUROSTAT)
Current account of thc BOP, % of
GDP
3.6
L7
t.7 2.5 2.6 0.9
0.1 , 0.7 l.l l.l
-1.3 0.4 0.3
-1.2 -0.8 4.7
l0.l 10.6 7.6 5.7
10.9 10.5 8.5 6.9
{.9
o.2
2.5
1.6
0.9
2.2
0.5
4.0
0.3
2.9
4.3
2.5
4.4
2.3
3.0
0.9
t.2 0.9
3.3 L9
0.0 -0.6 4.2
1.6 1.6 1.6
1.8
2.5
tu.2 109.E lll.l 113.6 115.8 117.0 114.2 110.7 108.8 tut3 1063 106.1
0.0
0.6
0.4
o.7
4.5
4.6
4.6
5.6
4.3
5.0
4.7
4.1
4.3
5.1
3.0 2.3 1.8
5.7 5.5 4.8
9.2 9.t 10.5 l0.l 9.1 7.9 7.9
8.3 8.9 9.3 8.7 7.2 5.6 5.7
7.7 9.0 9.9 tO.1 10.8 tO.1 10.3
9.4 9.6 10.0 9.9
7.7 8.2 8.t t.7
8.9 8.5 8.7 8.8
8.7
6.5
9.7
-3.0 -4.2 -2.6 -3.3 4.6 -5.4 -2.9 -1.2 -t.2 0.0 t.20.3
General government borrowing/lend- 4.9 -9.1 -7.2 -4.1
ing requirement, % of GDP
Exchange rates (yearly averager)
I USD =... DKR
I ECU =... DKR
ERM cffective exchangc rrtc (l)
l9 Partners cffective cxchangc rateg
(1)
3.4 2.5 0.2 4.7 -1.4 -1.6 -l.l
7.t 8.3 9.t 10.3 10.6 8.1 6.8 6.7 7.3 6.2 5.7 5.7
7.9 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.9 7-9 7-9
98.0 . 95.1 96.2 96.1 97.7 99.5 1005 99.0 97.6 100.5 lm.o 100.0
92.5 88.4 87.9 U.7 85.7 9l.l 95.0 93.2 90.7 97.6 98.6 98.6
-2.0
(l) exchange rate mecanism, doublc weighrcd forexports; index 1980
Source: Cqnmisrion services
For 1990 ro 1992: Cqnmission rtaff forecasrs (NOV 1990)
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Table 2: Analysls of GDP uses , es 96 - current prlccs
81 82 83 t4 85 86 87 89 90 91 92
Private consumption
Public consumption
GFCF
of which: equipment
Change in stocts
Balance in goods rnd services
Exports
Imports
56.0 55.0 54.6 54.5 54.t 55.0 54.0 53.4 52.8 52.5 5L9 52.7
n.8 28.2 n.4 U.9 25.3 23.9 8.2 25.6 25.1 M.8 U.4 23.8
15.6 16.1 16.0 17.2 18.7 20.8 19.7 18.3 18.2 r7.5 17.3 l7.3
6.2 7.O 6.9 7.8 8.8 9.7 8.1 7.4 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.1
4.2 0.2 0.0 t.2 0.8 0.8 4.7 -0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2
o.7 0.4 2.O r.3 0.3 4.4 1.8 3.1 3.5 5.0 5.4 6.0
36.5 36.4 36.4 36.7 36.7 3L0 31.4 32.3 34.3 35.0 35.9 36.9
35.8 35.9 34.4 35.5 36.3 32.5 29.6 29.2 30.t 29.9 30.5 30.9
Source: Commigrim scrviccs
For 1990 ro 1992l. Commigsion rteff forecagts (NOV 1990)
Table 3: Change ln demand components (a) and contrlbutlon to GDP growth (b), t9E0 prlces
929l908988878685828l
Evolution
Privatc consumption
Public consumption
GFCF
Domestic demand
(including stocks)
E ports
Imports
Contribution to growth (b)
Final domestic demand
(including stocks)
Foreign balance
CDP (a)
-2.3 1.4
2.6 3.1
-19.2 7.1
-4.1 3.5
8.2 2.5
-t.7 3.8
-4.2 3.4
3.3 -0.4
-0.9 3.0
2.6 3.4 5.0 5.7 -1.5 {.8 -0.8 0.6 0.6 1.3
0.0 -0.4 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.2 -1.3 -0.6 -1.5 -1.2
1.9 12.9 t2.6 t7.l -3.8 -6.6 0.2 -2.6 0.0 1.6
1.4 5.1 5.4 6.1 -2.2 -1.7 0.3 -0.8 -0.1 1.0
4.9 3.5
1.8 5.5
l.l -0.6 -1.0 -2.4
2.5 4.4 4.3 3.6
5.0 0.0 5.1 7.3 6.0 6.0
8.1 6.t -LO 1.4 4.2 2.4
3.9 4.4
1.7 2.8
0.8 1.6 1.0 0.9
1.2 0.9 0.9 1.8
5.3 6.1 -2.2 -1.7 0.3 -O.7 -0.1
2.5 2.2
0.3 0.5
(a) changc as % p.r.
@) changc as % of GDP of prcceding ycar
Sourcc: Commigion rcrviccs
For l99O ro 1992t Commission stafr forecasu (NOV 1990)
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Table 4: Balance of payments
81 82 83 84 85 85 87 88 89 90
l. Current balance
2. Recorded capital flows
3. Public sectfi borrowing
4. Private sector borrowing
5. Direct investments
A. inward
B. outward
6. Portfolio invegtments
A. Danish securities
B. foreign securities
7. Other Private scctor
borrowing
8. The banks external position
9. Unrecorded capital flowe
10. Changes in Denmarts
international liquidity
-12.3 -19.2 -128 -17.8 -28.8 -36.3 -20.3 -8.4 {.5 9.3
9.9 20.4 n.6
25.6 t7-4
19.3 50.5 25.3 5r.6
36.8 2t.l
23.3 -13.6 31.8
-5.8 -3.8 8.48.9 -5.7 4.3
1.0 -5.2 10.1 25.O 46.2 -u.5 30.5 29.t -9.8 23.5
-0.2
0.8
-1.0
0.6 0.1
1.2 0.9
-0.6 -0.t
-2.5 
-0.9
0.r 1.3
-2.6 -2.2
-3.0 -3.5
1.3 0.6
-4.3 -4.1
-1.4 -6.9 -1.8
3.4 7.9 7.5
-4.8 -14.8 -9.3
7.1 -19.5 t7.3
lt.6 -8.4 25.4
-4.5 -11.1 -8.1
18.4 7.7 17.9
0.5 -1.2 2.9
0.6 -0.4 3.5
-0.1 -0.8 -0.6
7.4 t4.3 -17.0 24.8
8.9 l7.l 1.0 19.8
-1.5 -2.8 -18.0 5.0
18.9 27.2 9.8 14.4-0.9 -4.8 2.2
1.6 0.2 5.0 t.t 5.6 -l.l -5.2 5.0 8.8 -9.9
-2.5 -3.4 -2.4 -5.4 4.5 -5.E -t.2 -6.2 -7.5 -19.6
-4.9 -2.2 12.4 -3.9 17.1 -16.8 30.0 8.7 -27.7 2t.6
Sources : Denmarts Nationalbank
Bibtiography 39
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andersen, T Flnansmlnlsteriet
"Det Danske Opsparingsproblem og pensionsdebatten", Finansregegorelse 90
Nationalokonomisk Tidskrift 21 1988
Fullerton, D.
Andersen' T and o' Rlsager 
"on rhe possibility of an Inverse Relationship Between
"Indkomstpolitikke,n under Firkloverregeringen", Natio- Tax Rates and Govemment Revenues". Journal of Pu-
nalokonomisk Tidskrift, 3/1988 blic Economics, 1982.
ArbeJderbevaegelsens Erhvervsraad Godley, W. and G.Zeztt
9O'ernes Skattereformer og Det Indre Marked, 1989 "Foreign debt, Foreign Trade and Living Conditions
with Special Reference to Denmark, Nationalokonomisk
Tidslcrift, 311989
Blsmut, C and Krbger, J
"The Dilenrmas of Economic Policy in France and Ger- ,--r----
many: Trade-offs between Inflation, ur,"-proyi"-nt-"lo Jackman' R' et al'
the Current Account" in De M6nil, G and V. Westphal "Unemployment policies", Economic Policy Vol.ll,
(eds) Stabilization Policy in France and the Federal re- 1990
public of Gerrrany, North-Holland 1985
Koch, C.
Calmfors, L' and R' Nymoen 
"Lon, Skat og Arbejdsudbud", Nationalokonomisk rids-
"Real Wage Adjustment and employment in the Nordic krift, 1990-l
countries", Economic Policy Vol.11, 1990
Muelbauer, M and A. Murphy
calmfors' L' and J' Drlfflll 
"Is the uK Balance of payments sustainable", Economic
"Bargaining structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Policy Vol. I I, 1990
Performance". Economic Policy 1988
Nlelsen, S.B.
chrlstensen A'M' and Knudsen' D' Den lille Aabne okonomi: Betalingsbalance og udlands,
Mona, August 1989 (unpublished) gaeld, March 1990, Unpublished
Dam, P.U. Skattemlnlsterlet
ADAM, Maj 1987, En Oversigt, Arbejdsnotat nr.23, Skatteredegoerelse 1990
Danmarks Statistik 1988
Smlth, N.
Ecksteln' o 
"wage andHours functions forMarriedMen andwomen
"The Great Recession, with a postscript on Stagflation". in Denmark, Working Paper 86-2, Aarhus School of
North-Holland 1978 Economics and Business Administration & Institute of
Economics, University of Aarhus
0 Bibliography
Smlth, N. Sorensen, P.B.
Household Labour Supply and Taxes in Denmark, Wor- "Skatteincitamenter til Opsparing og Investering: En
king Paper 1990, Institute of Economics, University of Vurdering af Firsernes Skattereformer", National-Aarhus okonomisk Tidskrift 3/1988
Sondergaard, J. and Nlelsen, S.B. Sorensen, P.B.
"Macroeconomic Policy and the external constraint: The 'Afskrivninger, Investcringer og Udenlandsgaeld". Oko-
Danish experience" Paper presented at I CEPR confe- nomi oy Politik 4-1988
rence in Athens May ?/l-6,1990
Taylor, C.T. and I.D. Savllle
sondergaaed' t' 
"Adjusting thc Balance of payments: General principles
"Pension og Opsparing", Samfundsokonomen 8/1990 and four case studies" ia Mortensen, J. (ed) Studies in
Banking and Finance, Vol.2, North Holland 1985
Economic Papers 4t
Economic Papers
The following papers have been issued. Copies may be obtained by applying to the address mentioned on the inside
front cover.
No. I EEC-DG II inflationary expectations. Survey based inflationary expectations for the EEC countries, by F.
Papadia and V. Basano (May 1981).
No. 3 A review of the informal economy in the European Community, by Adrian Smith (July 1981).
No. 4 Problems of interdependence in a multipolar world, by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (August l98l).
No. 5 European Dimensions in the Adjustment Problems, by Michael Emerson (August 1981).
No. 6 The bilateral trade linkages of the Eurolink Model : An analysis of foreign trade and competitiveness, by P.
Ranuzzi (January 1982).
No. 7 United Kingdom, Medium tenn economic trends and problems, by D. Adams, S. Gillespie, M. Green and
H. Wortmann (February 1982).
No. 8 Oil en est la th6orie macro6conomique, par E. Malinvaud (uin 1982).
No. 9 Marginal Employment Subsidies : An Effective Policy to Generate Employment, by Carl Chiarella and
Alfred Steinherr (November 1982).
No. l0 The Great Dcpression : A Repeat in the 1980s ?, by Alfred Steinherr (November 1982).
No. l l Evolution et problbmes structurels de l'6conomie n6erlandaise, par D.C. Breedveld, C. Depoortere,
A. Finetti, Dr. J.M.G. Pieters et C. Vanbelle (mars 1983).
No. 12 Macroeconomic prospects and policies for the European Community, by Giorgio Basevi,
Olivier Blanchard, Willem Buiter, Rudiger Dornbusch, and Richard Layard (April 1983).
No. 13 The supply of output equations in the EC-countries and the use of the survey-based inllationary
expectations, by Paul De Grauwe and Mustapha Nabli (May 1983).
No. 14 Suuctural uends of financial systems and capital accumulation : France, Germany, Italy, by G. Nardozzi
(May 1983).
No. l5 Monetary assets and inflation induced distorsions of the national accounts - conceptual issues and
corection of sectoral income flows in 5 EEC countries, by Alex Cukierman and Jorgen Mortensen
(May 1983).
No. 16 Federal Republic of Germany. Medium-term economic trends and problems, by F. Allgayer, S. Gillespie,
M. Green and H. Wortmann (June 1983).
No. 17 The employment miracle in the US and stagnation employment in the EC, by M. Wegner (July 1983).
No. 18 Productive Performance in West German Manufacturing Industry 1970-1980; A Farrell Frontier
Characterisation, by D. Todd (August 1983).
No. 19 Central-Bank Policy and the Financing of Government Budget Deficits : A Cross-Country Comparison,
by G. Demopoulos, G. Katsimbris and S. Miller (September 1983).
No. 20 Monetary assets and inflation induced distortions of the national accounts. The case of Belgium, by
Ken Lennan (October 1983).
No. 21 Actifs financiers et distorsions des flux sectoriels dues I I'inllation : le cas de la Francs, par J.-P. Bach6
(octobre 1983).
No. 22 Approche pragmatique pour une politique de plein emploi : les subventions I la cr6ation d'emplois,
par A. Steinherr et B. Van Haeperen (octobre 1983).
No. 23 Income Distribution and Employment in the European Communities 1960-1982, by A. Steinherr
(December 1983).
No. 24 U.S. Deficits, the dollar and Europe, by O. Blanchard and R. Dornbusch @ecember 1983).
No. 25 Monetary Assets and inflation induced distortions of the national accounts. The case of the Federal
Republic of Germany, by H. Wittelsberger (January 1984).
tu Economic Papers
No. 83 Completion of the internal market : An application of Public Choice Theory by Manfred Teutemann(August 1990)
No. 84 Monetary and Fiscal Rules for Public Debt Sustainability by Marco Buti (September 1990)
Economic Papers 45
Countfy Studies
No. I The Federal Republic of Germany (September 1990).
No. 2 Portugal (February 1991).
No. 3 United Kingdom (March 1991).
No.4 Denmark (April 1991).

